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Few notions have received such unequal and superficial treatment in
legal doctrine as the condominium.' Though studies on the condominium
date back to the late seventeenth century, they mainly focused on historical
cases related to the Holy Roman Empire or the Swiss Cantons and drew
heavily upon the private law analogy of joint ownership and undivided
property.2 However, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth
century, condominium began to inspire specialists of international law,
notably thanks to the establishment of condominia over the Island of the
Conference between France and Spain (1856) and over the Duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein between Prussia and Austria-Hungary (1865).'
However, international lawyers up to the present day too often simply
accommodate such public law notions as sovereignty and jurisdiction with
the domestic theory of common property, trying to locate each state's
rights and powers over condominial territory.4 This article attempts to
show that this attitude has led to a deadlock. It is the theory of a partial
international condominial community that serves to insert the notion of
condominium into a general theory of public international law and to
distinguish it from related situations.
Condominium is not the product of doctrinal thinking. The word was
used as such in the Gastein Convention of 1865 on the Duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein, and though there is no mention of it in the
conventions relating, for example, to the New Hebrides or the Sudan, it has
been widely resorted to in diplomatic correspondence. Although domestic
tribunals were often confronted with private disputes arising from
condominial regimes, they were very reluctant to use the term. Belgian
courts never mentioned it with regard to Moresnet. At the international
level, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) used the term
"condominium" to qualify the legal status of a bay in 1992. Whereas, the
Central-American Court of Justice had dispensed with it seventy-five years

1. See ABDALLAALI EL-ERIAN, CONDOmDIUJm ANDRELATED SrTUATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 10-14,23 (University Microfilms Int'l, Ann Arbor, MI 1977) (Cairo, Fouad I University Press
1952).
2. ALAN CORET, LE CONDOMINIUM I (Paris, LGDJ, 1960); Daniel P. O'Connell, The
Condominium of the New Hebrides, 1968/69, BRrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 77 (1970).

3. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 11. According to Abdalla EI-Erian, international law
textbooks written during the nineteenth century, with the exception of those by A.G. Heffter and
Alphonse Rivier, do not discuss condominium. See id. at 10, 12 (citing A.G. HEFFTER, LE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL DE L'EUROPE 154 (trans. J. Bergson, 4th ed. 1883); ALPHONSE RIVIER, 1 PRINCIPES
DU DROIT DES GENS 162 (1896)).

4. See id at 4-5.
5. See CORET, supranote 2, at 2-3.
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before.' Given the lack of interest in condominium and its equivocal and
conflicting meanings, one should not be obsessed with terminology but
should turn to objective analytical tools. This demarche is particularly
relevant when it comes to a concrete analysis of condominia, their day-today administration, and their relations to the international legal order.
I.

THE NOTION OF THE CONDOMINIUM

A. The PrivateLaw Approach
1. Condominia in Domestic Legal Systems
The use of the term "condominium" in international law was mostly
due to the influence of Roman, civil, and common law." One can certainly
draw an analogy between the private law institution of common property,
or undivided joint property, and condominium! Whether such an analogy
is justifiable is considered below.
a. Roman Law
It is well established that those scholars who first wrote on
international law had to rely heavily on the rules of Roman law,9 especially
when it came to dealing with territorial matters. Although the term
"condominium" itself was unknown to the Roman legal system, it seems
that it is the Communio pro Indivisio, or undivided joint property,' ° as

described by Gaius, Justinian, and Papinius that first inspired theories on
condominium. " Indeed, dominium usually meant full ownership in Roman
law. 2 Justinian classifies categories ofres in the following matter: (1) res

6. See EL-ERLAN, supra note 1, at 201.
7. Peter Schneider, Condominium, 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 58, 58 (1989).
8. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 4.
9. See id. at 25.

10. See id. at71.
11. See id. at 72-73 & nn.5-7 (citing WILLIAM ALEXANDER HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND
HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF ROMAN LAW IN THE ORDER OFA CODE EMBODYING THE INSTITUTES OF

GAIUs AND THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (trans. John Ashton Cross, 4th ed. 1903)). For a
discussion of Roman Law in general, see W.W. BUCKLAND, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF THE
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 58-119 (1912); MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1927).
12. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 74. The first branch of Roman private law relates to
persons. See id. at 72. There, the term dominium is used to describe the power ofthepaterfamilias
over his slave, together with manus (the power over his wife) and potestas (the power over his
children). See id. The exercise of dominium implied for thepaterfamiliasthe power of life and
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communes, things open to everyone, like the air; (2) res publicae, public
property of the state; (3) res universitatis, property of a corporation; (4) res
nullius,property of no one, and (5) communio, where property is common
to joint owners.' 3 In the last case, two or more owners own the whole thing
in common, with an undivided part of it belonging to each one of them
separately.' 4 It was first considered that each of the joint owners would
exercise potestas over the property held in common, with the power to
dispose of it in the case of a thing or to free a slave possessed in common. 5
From the first century B.C. onwards, it has been only a partial, independent
right of ownership that was exercised by each owner over the undivided
property. 6 In practice, a distinction was made between two cases.'7 First,
each co-owner could freely dispose of his undivided part of the joint
property, or mortgage it, since legal acts that only affected his share could
be performed without difficulty.IS However, in the second case, when the
act affected the whole thing, such as the decision to free a slave, each coowner had to give his consent for the act to be validly performed.' 9 In the
case of a slave, specifically, Justinian was the first to consider that masters
who owned a slave in common were obliged to sell their shares in the slave
to any one of the owners who wanted to free the slave.20
It was the rules of actio communi dividundo2" that made the partition
of a thing held in common possible, with the effect that the joint property
was divided among the owners, and that any excess of profit could be
recovered by a co-owner at disadvantage.22 When division was not

death in general, and in particular, the right to alienate his sons and slaves. See id.at 73. The
second part of Roman law relates to things. See id.at 72. In Roman law, rights are classified as
res incorporales,while the things to which these rights apply are considered res corporales. See

id. at 73. However, to the extent that the difference between an object and the right of ownership
of it is usually not made clear in the Roman law literature, it could be considered that the rules of
an acquisition of res corporales are, in fact, to be applied to the acquisition of the right of
ownership of the thing itself, that is, of dominium, whether by lege (by the effect of law),
adjudicatione(by a judicial sentence) or praescriptione(by the operation of time) under the jus
civile, or by occupatio(occupation), accession (natural increase), or traditio(transfer either inter

vivos or by testament or succession) under thejus gentium. See id. at 73 & n.7.
13. See id.at 74-75.
14. See id.at 75.
15. See id
16. See id
17. See id.at 75-76.
18. Seeid. at76.
19. See id.
20. See id
21. See id. at 77.

22. See id at 77-78.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/3
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possible, as in the case of "a slave or a mule," the proceeds following the
sale of the property were divided instead, with a right to compensation
when the division was unequal.2 3
b. Civil Law
In French civil law, Article 815 of the Civil Code speaks of the state
of indivision, particularly when the same thing is bequeathed to several
heirs.24 The theory of condominium in French law was greatly inspired by
the Roman jurists.2" Hence, each of the two co-owners is considered as
possessing in abstract one-half of every atom of the thing and is entitled to
perform legal acts not in contradiction with this status.26
In German law, joint property is known as gesammte Hand and
corresponds to the French legal notion of copropridtden main commune,
according to which the joint owners gather into one single entity to which
the right to administer and alienate the property belongs, 7 Two other
forms of copropriety (Miteigentum)are known in German law.2 The first
is the Gemeinschaftzur Gesammten Hand,which describes the community
of goods in a marriage settlement, or the common ownership of a
partnership. 9 The other is the GemeinschaftnachBruchteilen,where each
of the co-owners is entitled to alienate his undivided share in the
Gemeinschaft without having to secure the agreement of the other

23. Id. at 78. As aptly noted by El-Erian:
The legal nature of the right of the co-owner and of the relation between him and
the other owners is controverted. Does each owner hold dominium of the whole
limited by the concurrence of others, as was the rule in ancient Roman law? And
if this was no longer valid, does he own only his own undivided part, or a
potential physical part not yet determined? Or is his right not ownership at all, but
an analogous right? All these opinions and others were held, as no text settled the
matter.

Id at 78 n.17.
24. See id. at 79.
25. See id.
26. See id Most of the Civil Codes that were influenced by the Code Napol6on embody
Roman and French jurisprudence. See id at 80. The Civil Code of Nicaragua was resorted to by

an international tribunal to settle a dispute regarding the legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca. See
id; infra text accompanying notes 176-94. Article 1698 of this Code provides that"'[n]one of the
Coparceners may make any change in the thing held in common, even though such change would
operate to the advantage of all, in the absence of their consent thereto."' Id
27. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 81.
28. See id. at 82.
29. See id.
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owners.3" Note that this consent is needed in the Gemeinschaft zur
Gesammten Hand.3
c. Common Law
English law distinguishes between a "joint tenancy" and a "tenancy
in common., 3 2 The former includes a right of survivorship while the latter
does not.33 An estate held injointure has a fourfold unity. 3" First is a unity
of interest where one of the joint tenants cannot be a tenant for life while
the other is a tenant for only a certain number of years, and where one
cannot be a tenant in fee, while the other is a tenant in tail.35 Second is a
unity of title where the estate ofjoint tenants is established by one and the
same act. 36 Third is the unity of time, where the estate must be vested for
one and the same period. 37 Fourth is the unity of possession where joint
tenants are said to be "seized 'per my and per tout,' by the one half or
moiety and by all, that is, they each of them have the entire possession, as
well as every parcel, as of the whole., 3 Each joint tenant possesses an
undivided
moiety of the whole, rather than the whole of an undivided
moiety. 339

Joint tenants can put an end to a tenancy by disuniting their shares,
either by dividing the property or by holding it in severalty.4° When they
do so, the right of survivorship no longer exists." Unanimous consent was
required under common law, but by statute of Henry VIII, one joint tenant
could ask for the division of lands by a writ of partition.42

30. See id.
31. See id
32. Id
33. See id If real property was bequeathed by A to B and C under a joint tenancy, C
remained the sole owner if B died, since B's title to the property could not pass on to his heirs. See
id On the other hand, in a tenancy in common, each tenant could dispose of his undivided share

in the property and bequeath it to his heirs, whether or not his will contained a provision to that
effect. See id at 82-83.

34. See id at 83.
35. See id
36. See id

37. See id.
38. Id
39. See id
40. See id at 84.
41.

See id.

42. Id Under common law, there are two additional types ofjoint property: coparcenary
estates and estate in entirety, see id, the subtleties of which need not be analyzed herein.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/3
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Joint tenancies have been replaced by tenancies in common by the
statutes of various states in the United States, although both forms of
tenancies still exist "'as they have been described by Blackstone."' 43
When a property is divisible, the tenancy may be destroyed by the tenants
and divided among them by an action for partition.' In the opposite case,
the property is sold and the proceeds are divided.45
2. Problems with Private Law Analogies
"The part of international law upon which private law has engrafted
itself most deeply is [probably] that relating to modes of acquiring territory
and territorial sovereignty." It is well established that Roman law and
private law in general were a great source of inspiration to the founding
fathers of international law.47 According to Hersch Lauterpacht, many
argue that it would be ridiculous to assume that a state's relations with its
territory are analogous to that of an individual and his property.48
Nevertheless, there are many examples "where territory has been treated
as the subject of a right external to the State.'" 9 Indeed, the first examples
43. Id at 85 (quoting BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 343 (B.C. Gavit ed.,
1941)). Nevertheless, the major difference is that ajoint tenancy is created under the common law

if-the nature of the tenancy is not stipulated, that is, when the property is conveyed "in fee simple,"
while the opposite rule usually prevails in the United States. Id at 86.
44. See id. at 86.
45. See id.
46. Id at 25.
47. See id Indeed, Grotius, in his De JureBelli ac Pacis,uses the Roman notion of property
in his theory of "public domain" and "eminent domain." Id at 25-26 (citing HuGO GROTIUS, DE
JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, IN QUIBUS IUS NATURAE ETGENTIUM, ITEM JURIS PULBICI PRAECIPUA

EXPLICANTUR 219, 262, 264 (trans. F.W. Kelsey et al., Carnegie Inst. 1925)). Pufendorf, writing
on the right of the state in its territory, was inspired by such rules on private ownership as existed
in Roman law. See id. at 26 (citing SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE
UNIVERSALIS LIBRI Duo 23, 57 (trans. William Abbott Oldfather 1931)). Vattel discussed "res
communes" and "res universitatis" in Roman law to introduce dominium eminens,which is the right
of the "supreme power over all parts of the territory belonging to the nation." Id. at 27 (citing
EMER DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU, PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQus A LA
CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 94-96 (1916)).

48. Hersch Lauterpacht, Rfgles gindralesdu droit de la paix, 62 RECUEIL DES CouRs DE
L'ACADtMIEDEDROITINTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.], IV, § 99, at 318-19 (1937). "Beaucoupjugent
... absurde d'essayer de mouler le probl~me, en partie modeme, de la souverainetd territoriale sur
la vieille conception patrimoniale et de consid6rer que les rapports existant entre l'Etat et son
territoire sont de meme nature que ceux d'un individu avec sa terre ou tout autre bien lui
appartenant." Id.
49. "oti le territoire a 6td traitd comme faisant l'objet d'un droit extdrieur i l'Etat." Id In his
leading book on the relations between private and international law, Lauterpacht wrote that "[i]t
hald] become a custom with publicists... to base their argument on the assertion that the opinion
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ofjoint ownership over a territory heavily draw upon a patrimonial notion
of property. The condominia created during the Holy Roman Empire met
the requirements of feudal and inheritance law, for example, Prussia and
Lippe's common suzerainty over the city of Lippstadt, the condominium
between Hesse and Baden over Ktirndorf, and the Kommunion of
Unterharz.50 Many of these entities existed under the feudal system when
the difference between private law and public law was somewhat blurred;
whether they can be considered international condominia is controversial
and doubtful."' Moreover, works on condominium as a term of
international law date back to the seventeenth century, when sovereignty
and ownership were still mixed. In 1682, Fromann wrote that
"' [c]ondominium territorii est Condominium, seujus duobus vel pluribus,
immediate Imperio Romano Germanico subjectis, in districtu aliquo cum
Superioritate competens, quo is curom proprius est, propartibus indivisis' 2
the notion of a condominium is, however, essentially grasped with the
private law rules of succession.53 One knows that the Positivists rejected
rules of international law that did not expressly or impliedly stem from the

will of states, in a treaty or a customary rule. 4 Therefore, they concluded
that private law could not be a source of international law."
Abdalla Ali E1-Erian considers that Article 38(3) of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.), and more recently,

with which they happen to disagree is nothing else than a misleading analogy to a conception of
private law." H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
at vii (1927).
50. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 90; Schneider, supra note 7, at 58. As explained by
Kirchenheim in his article on Kondominat: "In earlier times, the reasons [for the establishment of
a condominium rested] especially in the feudal law; reigning families wished to keep a common
estate (possession). For this reason, there were many condominia in the old German empire, which
disappeared for the most part in the 19th century.... Also for centuries in Switzerland several
cantons jointly ruled single areas, which by no means belonged to the ones which were
administered the best." Kirchenheim, Kondominat, in WORTERBUCHDESVOLKERRECHTSUNDDER
Di'LOMATIE 655 (Karl Strupp ed., 1924).
51. See EL-ERIAN, supranote 1, at 91.
52. CORET, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting JOHANN ANDREAS FROMANN, TRACTATIO DE
cONDOMINIO TERRITORIi 9 (Tilbingen 1682)).
53. See id. "Maevius habens territorium moritur, reliquens ex utroque praemortuofilio,
nepotes numero pares: qui ipsi utique condominium acquale vel succedendo acquirunt.... " Id
(quoting FROMANN, supra note 52, at 16). In 1719, G. Wagner wrote De condominio territorii
dissertatio. See id. In 1776, K. Hoffmann wrote De condominio, both using the same analytical
tools as Fromann. K. HOFFMANN, DE CONDOMMnO (1776).
54. EL-ERIAN, supra note I, at 29-30.
55. See id at 29.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/3
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Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the I.C.J. achieved a compromise 6 by
"recognizing the existence of a third source of international law
independent-of, although merely supplementary to, custom or treaty. 57
Indeed, there are strong grounds to support the view that the Committee of
Jurists that drafted Article 38(3) had in mind those legal rules that are
recognized by the main systems ofjurisprudence and would be resorted to
in order to avoid a non liquet." However, one should note that the utmost
caution is needed when resorting to private law analogies, and this was
constantly recalled by the I.C.J. 59 With respect to servitudes, the P.C.I.J.
had stated that it was "not called upon to take a definite attitude with
regard to the question, which is moreover of a very controversial nature,
whether in the domain of international law, there really exist servitudes
analogous to the servitudes of private law." ° With regard to mandates, the

56. See id. at30n.17,31, 37.
57. Id at 30. The author doubts that the purpose of Article 38 really is to list sources of
international law.
58. See id at 31; Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106

RC.A.D.I., 1962, II, at 5, 56-57 (1963).
On one side there are jurists like Verdross, who say that Article 38 has the effect
of incorporating "natural law" in international law and even claim that positive
rules of international law are invalid if they conflict with natural law. [This view
was also advocated by Baron Descamp of Belgium, the Chairman of the
Committee of Jurists.] At the other extreme are jurists like Guggenheim and
Tunkin, who maintain that paragraph (c) adds nothing to what is already covered
by treaties and custom .... In between stands the majority of jurists.... They
take the line that general principles recognized in national law constitute a
reservoir of principles which an international judge is authorized by Article 38 to
apply in an international dispute, if their application appears relevant and
appropriate in the different context of inter-State relations.
Waldock, supra,at 55-56 (footnotes omitted). Witness the statement by Lord Phillimore of Great
Britain that "[tihe general principles referred to... were those which were accepted by all nations
inforo domestico, such as certain principles of procedures, the principle of good faith, and the
principle of resjudicata." Procks verbaux of the Proceedingsof the Committee, June 16-July 24,

1920, LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUB., at 336 (1920). Note that these general principles also have been
considered as being inherent to any legal order, and that some writers have distinguished between
"principesgindraux de droit" and "principesgdniraux du droit," emphasizing that there exist
principles that are peculiar to the international society, such as sovereignty.
59. See Waldock, supra note 58, at 61.
60. S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 24 (Aug. 17); see North Atlantic
Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb., Sept. 7, 1910); AalandIslands,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 3 (1920).
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I.C.J. said that they "had only the name in common with the several
of mandate
national law." 61
notions
One
wonders inwhether
the study of condominium in public
international law gains anything by comparing it with joint or common
property in domestic law.62 Indeed, common law and civil law regulate the
right of ownership of each co-owner over their property, whether over the
whole or over an undivided part of it, the right to dispose of their share or
the impossibility of each co-owner to perform legal acts affecting the
whole thing, and the various ways the right of ownership can be exercised,
ceded, or abused.63 But, this is not relevant to an analysis of the
relationship between sovereign states and the territory put under theirjoint
authority, for it is not a right ofjoint "ownership" to which a condominium
is subject." In some domestic legal systems, a co-owner is entitled to
freely dispose of his or her share, whereas a state party to an agreement
creating a condominium cannot dispense with the consent of the other
parties, to the extent that such an international agreement usually provides
for rules on joint action as regards condominial territory and not for

61. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 132 (Advisory Opinion of
July 11) [hereinafter South-West Africa]. In his Separate Opinion, Judge McNair pointed out that
it was never a question of importing into international law private law institutions"'lock, stock and
at 148 (separate opinion of Judge
barrel,' ready-made, and fully equipped with a set of rules." Id.
McNair). It was rather a question of finding in the private law institutions indications of legal
policy and principles appropriate to the solution of the international problem at hand. See id.
(separate opinion of Judge McNair). In Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd (Second
Phase)(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. § 50, at 1,38 (Feb. 5), the I.C.J. was confronted with a purely
municipal law problem that it had to tackle at the international level. The Court stated:
[Tihere are no corresponding institutions of international law to which the Court
could resort. Thus the Court has, as indicated, not only to take cognizance of
municipal law but also to refer to it. It is to rules generally accepted by municipal
legal systems which recognize the limited company whose capital is represented
by shares, and not to the municipal law of a particular State, that international law
refers. In referring to such rules, the Court cannot modify, still less deform them.
Id. On the contrary, Judge Morelli in his Separate Opinion was of the view that the Court should
have relied on Spanish law, since it was that legal order that determined the vested rights of
shareholders in Spain. See id at 236-38 (separate opinion of Judge Morelli). In addition, Judge
Tanaka thought that the Court should not have felt bound by municipal law concepts and should
have recognised their relative validity according to different fields and institutions. See id at 121
(separate opinion of Judge Tanaka).
62. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 79-80.
63. See id. at 80.
64. See id

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/3
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individual rights of ownership over such territory.6" EI-Erian clearly favors
the supplementary function of private law, although recognizing that
"[w]hile the legal relation is sometimes identical and as such raises no
obstacle to analogy between the two systems, that is not always the case."
However, he draws heavily upon notions of private law in order to explain
the notions of dominium and condominium. He states that "[s]ome writers
...overlook[ed] the historical function of Dominium and the fact that the
State's rights in its territory do resemble in more than one respect the right
of the individual in his estate." ' He argues as follows:
All the factors to be considered in allowing analogy
between international law and private law.., apply to the
analogy between Dominium and territorial sovereignty.
While territorial sovereignty is analogous to Dominium,
it is not identical with it. The state has the right to property as
a corporate entity which is no more than the private law right.
But its right to territorial sovereignty is different as it entitles
it to what is called "sovereign rights" which it does not
possess
with regard to the things it possesses under private
68
law.
EI-Erian explains that "[i]f Dominium in international law is territorial
sovereignty for which we set as a criterion the title to the territory, then
Condominium is joint sovereignty possessed by two or more states in a
certain territory.'6 9
One is thus led to share the view of Alain Coret, who aptly remarks:
One of the great paradoxes with Mr. EI-Erian's analysis
lies in the fact that, after having largely resorted to private
law, he definitely shifts to public law. Actually, this new
orientation is certainly detrimental to the clarity of his
demonstration.
Dominium presented analogies with
territorial sovereignty; it now appears that it merges together
with the latter.70

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 79-80.
EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 38.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99.
Ce n'est point l'un des moindres paradoxes de I'analyse de M. El[-E]rian que,
parvenue Ace point AI'aide d'un recours singuli6rement dtendu au droit privd, elle
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Coret further argues:
The "additional" resort to private law is only relative in Mr.
El Erian's analysis and, in fact, it would be more accurate to
talk of a "principal" resort thereto. The reference to the other
sources of international law which, incidentally, were defined
in the same Article 38 [of the Statute of the P.C.I.J.], was
practically obliterated.
Actually, the notion of dominium went through a
transmutation by entering the sphere of international
law ....
The dominium eminens in international law is,
indeed, fundamentally different from dominium in private
law... ." Mr. El Erian mistakenly bases himself on pure
dominium and then arrives at dominium eminens without ever
qualifying the term "dominium . . ."
[This] distinction... can only lead the supporters of the
private law theory to a deadlock:
- if they maintain their conception of "pure"
dominium, they are forced to see in condominium an
"islet" of private law in international law. But, as we
have shown, this is precisely a conclusion which Mr. El
Erian rejects;...
if they opt for the dominium eminens conception,
they prove that resort to private law was misleading, to
the extent that dominium eminens is in fact territorial
sovereignty, hence, a notion of pure public law.'

s'oriente en conclusion rdsolument vers le droit public; cette nouvelle orientation
ne va point d'ailleurs sans nuire Ala clartd de la demonstration. Le dominium
prdsentait des analogies avec la souverainetd territoriale; il apparait ddsormais
qu'il se confond avec cette demiire.
CORET, supranote

2, at 12.

71. Dominium is actual ownership by the state, while dominium eminens is the right that a
sovereignty has repecting the property of its subjects.

72.
[Nous observons que la valeur "suppldtive" du recours au droit privd est toute
relative dans I'analyse de M. El Erian et qu'il conviendrait de parler de valeur
"principale" de ce meme recours; la rdfdrence aux autres sources du droit
international, ddfini[e]s d'ailleurs par le meme article 38 [of the Statute of the
P.C.I.J.], a t6 pratiquement oublie.
En v6ritd, c'est une transmutation que la notion de dominium a subie en
pdndtrantdans la sphere du droit international .... Le dominium eminens du droit
international est, en effet, fondamentalement different du dominium du droit
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Hence, one is left with the view that private law is unable to tackle
the notion of condominium. First, it cannot give a satisfactory
classification of the various types of condominia and distinguish them
from related situations, such as coimperia, or protectorates, since this
involves concepts of public international law."3 Secondly, the private law
approach restricts the analysis to the territorial aspect of condominium and
neglects problems of personal jurisdiction, public services, international
responsibility, and so forth. 4 All this obviously calls for the use of
international law to define the concept of condominium.
B. The InternationalLaw Approach

1. Loopholes of a State-Centered Analysis
Legal doctrine is far from being in agreement when it comes to
condominium. Actually, there seem to be as many definitions as there are
authors writing about it." However, this confusion should not debar us
from tackling the problem, since stating that "the concept of condominium
is unstable and incongruous, and that each regime ofjoint supremacy is sui
generis"6 is probably the best way to avoid any serious analysis.
Nevertheless, one must admit that one is faced with much variety when
surveying some of the definitions that have been proposed." According

. . . L'erreur de M. El[-E]rian est de partir du dominium pur pour
d~boucher ensuite sur le dominium eminens en conservant toujours le terme
dominium sans dpithte ....
[Cette] distinction... enferme vdritablement dans une impasse les partisans
de la thdorie privatiste:
- s'ils maintiennent leur conception du dominium "pur", ils sont dans
l'obligation de voir dans le condominium un "ilot" i base de droit privd, en
droit international; mais c'est pricisdment une conclusion i laquelle, comme
nous l'avons montrt, ne se rallie pas M. El[-E]rian;...

privd .

- s'ils optent pour la conception du dominium eminens, ils administrent

la preuve que le recours au droit privd dtait illusoire, dans la mesure o6 le
dominium eminens est en d6finitive la souverainett territoriale, en d'autres
termes, une notion de pur droit public.
COREr, supra note 2, at 15-17 (footnote added).
73. See id. at 18-19
74. See id.at 19-20.
75. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 14-17.

76. O'Connell, supranote 2, at 81.
77. See CORET, supra note 2, at 37.
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to Lauterpacht, a territory subject to a condominium is clearly under a
division of sovereignty, or joint sovereignty, or both.7 For Arrigo
Cavaglieri, there are many examples where delineating a border would
have caused so many problems that it was impossible for the interested
states to reach agreement. 79 Under such circumstances, the territory was
putpro indivisiounder the contesting powers' joint authority.' And Lassa
Oppenheim believes that a condominium is a "piece of territory consisting
of land or water... under the joint tenancy of two or more States, [with]
these several States exercising sovereignty conjointly over it, and over the
individuals living thereon."'" Fauchille argues that one can find cases of
joint ownership, condominium or co-imperium, other than international
servitudes, where two sovereignties jointly exercised authority over the
same territory."2 For Max Sorensen, "some territories have been subject to
a division of authority between two or more states, [and] the most frequent
form of this kind of divided authority over the same territory is termed
'condominium' or 'coimperium.' "3 Finally, for Marcel Sibert, there is a
condominium when two or more states together exercise joint sovereignty
on the same territory, and such sovereignties mutually limit their activities,
at least in principle, on the grounds of the legal equality." In the
78. See Lauterpacht, supra note 48, at 322.
Un territoire sous condominium constitue un exemple clair soit de division de
souverainetd, soit d'exercice en commun de la souverainett sur un territoire
donn6, ou encore des deux modalit6s i la fois. C'est la n6gation de l'indivisibilitd
de la souverainetd territoriale.
Id
79. See Arrigo Cavaglieri, Raglesgeniralesdu droitde lapaix,26 R.C.A.D.I., I, at 315, 388
(1929). "I! se peut que I'dtablissement de la frontibre sur certains points prdsente de telles
difficult6s qu'il soit impossible aux Etats intdressds d'arriver i un accord." Id
80. See id. "Tant que cet accord n'est pas possible, on soumet le territoire pro indivisio A
l'autoritd commune des Puissances contestantes, qui y organisent une administration commune.
II y a de nombreux exemples historiques de ce condominium. . . ." Id
81. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 171, at 409 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed.
1953). Note that the writer mixes into his definition the private law concept ofjoint tenancy and
the public law notion of sovereignty, which he rightly does not limit to territory.
82. 1 PAUL FAUCHILLE, TRArnt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 684 (1922). "A c8td des
servitudes internationales on rencontre des cas de co-propridtd, de condominium ou de co-

imperium, qui font que deux souverainetds s'exerceront d'une mani6re indivise sur un m8me
territoire." Id
83. MAX SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (1968).
84. See I MARCEL SIBERT, TRAIT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 388 (1951).

[III y a condominium quand deux ou plusieurs Etats exercent, ensemble, sur un
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nineteenth century, A.G. Heffier noted that two states could also exercise

divided or undivided sovereignty over a foreign territory (condominium), 5
while Alphonse Rivier noted that a territory or a portion thereof, whether
land or water, could belong pro indivisio to two or more states.8
One immediately has to admit how confusing these various
definitions are. By taking sovereignty as a starting point, they all try to
accommodate it with the special nature of a condominium. But whichever
definition of sovereignty one is ready to accept, it is in fact the idea of
sovereignty itself, as we shall see, that is ill-suited iocharacterize a
condominium. 7
In the classical view of Bodin, Vattel, and later, Jellinek, sovereignty
was the ultimate authority, the suprema potestas or Kompetenz

Kompetenz. 8 In reaction to such an extremist view, which leaves each
state to determine its own competence and which necessarily implies the
negation of international law,"9 some authors have tried to tackle
meme territoire soumis i leur commune souverainetd, la sdrie des comp~tences
dtatiques: dans l'exercice de leur activitt les souverainet6s se limitent
mutuellement mais, du moins et en principe, en vertu de l'tgalitd juridique des
Etats, doivent-elles le faire sur la base de ia stricte identitd des droits.
Id

85. See HEFFTER, supra note 3, at 141. "[D]eux Etats... [quil peuvent encore exercer la
souverainetd divise ou indivise d'un territoire 6tranger (condominium)." Id
86. RivnER, supra note 3, at 162. "Un territoire, ou une portion de territoire, terre ou eau,
peut appartenir, par indivis, Adeux ou plusieurs Etats." Id
87. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 53.
88. See CORET, supra note 2, at 27; EL-ERiAN, supra note 1, at 52 & n.64.
89. See I GEORGES SCELLE, PRttS DU DROIT DES GENS 7, 13-14 (1932).
La souverainetd est une notion d'ordre public qui implique le pouvoir pour un
individu de faire tout ce qu'il veut et, par consdquent, d'imposer sa volontd Atous
les autres individus. Or, ce pouvoir absolu n'existe pas en fait dans une
socidtd ....
Tout sujet de droit qui se pr6tnd souverain s'insurge imm6diatement contre
le Droit et le nie.
[Sovereignty is a notion of public order which, for an individual, implies the
power to do whatever he wants and, consequently, to impose his will on all other
individuals. However, this power does not exist in the facts in society ....
Any subject of law who pretends to be sovereign immediately tramples on the
law and negates it.]
Id at 13. Remember that Duguit sought to get rid of sovereignty itself because it implied for him
unlimited will and power. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 58 (citing L. Duguit, The Law and the
State, 31 HARV. L. REV. I (trans. F.J. deSloovere, 1917)). Duguit states that any power is subject to
law and circumscribed by its purpose. See id
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sovereignty differently, by emphasizing that sovereignty has to be inserted
into a general theory of international law,"° or with the notion of
competence as attributed to states by international law itself.9 Hence,
sovereignty becomes a formal legal concept that merely postulates and
legitimizes legal powers and indeed can vary from time to time.92 Those
competences are thus attributes of sovereignty, while sovereignty so
defined is not synonymous with supreme authority or with a power outside
the law. 93 It only describes the content of a competence. 9 It would be
equivalent to "plenitude de competence [fullness of competence]. "95
Following the works of Ernst Radnitzky 96 and Charles Rousseau,9' one
usually classifies competences as territorial, personal, or governmental
("competence relative aux services publics").9
None of these approaches gives a clear account of what a
condominium is. If one takes the classical view of sovereignty as a starting
point, one immediately has to point out that there are two distinct
sovereignties that have joint authority (but state sovereignty by definition
excludes any other sovereignty on the same territory), or there is a joint
sovereignty that cannot be exercised by an entity other than a state. 99 All
the quotations above reveal this dilemma. How could states, according to
Sibert, exercisejoint sovereignty over a territory and at the same time limit
the exercise of their respective sovereign rights? How could a
condominium, for Lauterpacht, be at the same time an example of a

90. See Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States'as a Basis for
International Organization, 53 YALE L.J. 207, 207 (1944). "A State's legal authority may be said
to be 'supreme' in so far as it is not subjected to the legal authority of any other State; and the State
is then sovereign when it is subjected only to international law... ." Id at 208.
91. See EL-ERAN, supra note 1, at 58 (citing SCELLE, supranote 89, at 13).
92. Those competencies are thus neither absolute nor unlimited: they are defined by the
international legal order according to the evolution of the international community.
93. Maurice Bourquin, Ragles gndnrales du droit international de lapaix, 35 R.C.A.D.I., I,
at 5, 117 (1931). "Elle [sovereignty] n'est synonyme ni d'instance supreme, ni de pouvoir
dchappant au droit." Id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See Ernst Radnitzky, Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebietes, 20 ARCHLY FOR
OFFENTLICHES RECHT 313-55 (1905).
97. See CHARLES ROussEAU, DROrr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 95-211 (3rd ed. 1965).
98. Id. at 98 (personelle), 154-211 (territoriale),99-100 (aux services).
99. See HUBERT BENOIST, LE CONDOMINIUM DES NOUVELLE HtBRIDES ET LA SOCItIt
lI..AIENN
4 (1972). "Ou bien il s'agit de deux souverainetds distinctes exerc6es en commun
mais la souverainetd dtatique exclut pr6cis6ment tout autre souverainet6 dans son territoire
d'exercice, ou bien il s'agit d'une souverainetd commune, mais il n'est pas concevable qu'elle soit

exercke par une entitd autre qu'un Etat." Id.
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division of sovereignty and of joint sovereignty? Some views blatantly
contradict each other, for condominium sometimes means division of
sovereignty (Sorensen), sometimes undivided sovereignty (Fauchille,
Cavaglieri, and Rivier), and sometimes even both (Heffter).°°
Furthermore, there is considerable confusion as to the use of
"sovereignty," "jurisdiction," "government," "puissance publique,"
"competence," "territorial supremacy,"'O' and as to the lack of distinction
between the exercise of sovereign rights and the enjoyment thereof (a
famous private law dichotomy which, as we shall see, is of pivotal
importance when it comes to distinguishing, for example, condominium
from coimperium). Still, one might try to defend the sovereignty-oriented
concept by stating that states forming a condominium merely assert their

100. Also witness the confusion of Hildebrando Accioly:
En principe, on ne peut admettre la coexistence de deux... souverainetds
completes sur un meme territoire.
... [Pourtant... l'on connalt des cas d'exercice conjoint de lajuridiction,
par deux ou plusieurs Etats, sur un meme territoire.... [I11 n'y a pas, en pareil
cas, Aproprement parler, co-existence de deux souverainetds, mais seulement
partage d'attributions de la souverainet6 entre deux ou plusieurs puissances
distinctes, ou l'exercice de la competence de chacune Ades moments diffdrents.
[In principle, one cannot admit the co-existence oftwo complete sovereignties
on just one territory.
... However,... there are examples ofjoint exercise ofjurisdiction by one
or several States on the same territory.... Nevertheless, this is not a genuine case
of a co-existence of two sovereignties, but only a case of a sharing of the attributes
of sovereignty between two or several distinct powers, or a case of the exercise of
each power's jurisdiction at different times.]
I HILDEBRANDo AccIOLY, TRAITt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 257 (1940). Thus, for
Accioly, there would be one sovereignty whose attributes are partitioned and exercised at different
times and in respect of different matters. But this definition merely substitutes sovereignty for
jurisdiction, confuses separate jurisdiction with joint jurisdiction, and reduces sovereignty to an
aggregation of its attributes. In Islandof PalmasCase (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 831, 838 (Penn.
Ct. Arb. Apr. 1928), Arbitrator Max Huber stated as follows:
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to
the exclusion ofany other State, the functions of a State.... The special cases of

the composite State, of collective sovereignty, etc., do not fall to be considered
here and do not, for that matter, throw any doubt upon the principle which has just
been enunciated.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 16-19 (discussing these terms).
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own sovereignty, though the exercise of their sovereign rights is restricted
and limited. 1 2 This view, however, completely contradicts the notion of
condominium, since no state with authority over a condominium [les Etats
condominants] could decide alone to modify the territory's status as
condominium. 3 None of the states enjoy all of the attributes of
sovereignty over the condominium, only the condominial community of
these states does."

The theory of competence also does not provide much help. Indeed,
Rousseau himself rightly excludes the concept of sovereignty to explain a
condominium. However, he gives a rather ambiguous definition: a
condominium is defined precisely by the joint ownership [1'indivision

102. See S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.CJ (ser. A) No. 1, at 22-25 (Aug. 17).
103. See COREr, supra note 2, at 28. "Aucun des Etats condominants n'a, en effet,
compdtence pour decider & lui seul et en dernier ressort de toute modification du statut du
condominium... ." Id.
104. Id. at 30-31. "[I]1 est bien certain qu'aucun des Etats condominants ne dispose Alui seul

[de lajouissance] des attributs de la souverainetd dans le territoire condominia... [car] c'est Ala
seule commnunaut6 de ces memes Etats qu'appartient cettejouissance." Id. However, the theory
of sovereignty has been applied by the Belgian Court of Cassation to the condominium of Moresnet
between Belgium and Prussia. See id. at 38; infra text accompanying notes 165-70. The court

stated in the motives as follows:
"Attendu que le traitt de Versailles ... a proclamd la souverainet6 de la Belgique
sur le territoire de Moresnet neutre.
Attendu que cet article n'op~re aucun transfert de souverainetd, qu'il
n'attribue pas ala Belgique un territoire nouveau mais fait simplement disparaltre
l'obstacle que les prdtentions de i'Allemagne mettaient i i'exercice de sa pleine
souverainett ....
Attendu que le titre de souverainetd de la Belgique sur cette commune ne doit
pas 8tre recherchd dans le trait6 de Versailles qui constate uniquement la
reconnaissance par I'Allemagne de cette souverainetd, mais qu'il doit 8tre trouvd
dans les traitd de Vienne de 1815...
[Consideringthat the Treaty of Versailles has proclaimed Belgian sovereignty
over the territory of neutral Moresnet.
Considering that this Article does not effect any transfer of sovereignty, that
it does not attribute a new territory to Belgium, but that it removes the obstacles
which the claims of Germany had put in the way of the exercise of her full
sovereignty;
Considering that the Belgian title for sovereignty over this town is not to be
looked for in the Treaty of Versailles, which merely takes note of the recognition
by Germany of this sovereignty, but rather in the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 .... I
CORET, supra note 2, at 38-39 (quoting Kepp et consorts, May 22, 1925, Pasicrisie Beige, Vol. I,
1925, at 253-55). Note that the "joint sovereignty" concept is also adopted by EI-Erian. EL-ERIAN,

supranote I, at 99-100.
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territoriale]that it establishes. It is this feature that is common to the
various definitions that have been proposed to exclude the idea of an
exclusivisme territorial[single sovereignty] over the condominium. °5 But
then Rousseau explains that it is the collaboration dgalitaire,a direct
exercise of cosovereignty, that is the essence of a condominium." 6
Actually, this theory also leads to a deadlock since people have sought to
determine to what extent individual states have exercised jurisdiction over
condominia, transforming the study of condominium into a study of
limited territorial jurisdiction."°

2. The Theory of the Partial International Condominial Community
The great flaw in the state-centered analysis is the attempt to analyze
how condomini qua states were to enjoy and exercise sovereignty, or
competences, over their condominium. This approach can only lead to a
deadlock for the simple reason that it is a community ofstates that enjoys

105. See Charles Rousseau, Cours de droit internaitonalpublic, (doctorat), 1948-49 LES
CouRs DE DROIT 107. "[Plareille analyse exclut tout appel A I'id6e de souverainet6 .... II ne
saurait du reste en aller autrement, puisque le condominium se d~finit pr~cisdment par l'indivision
territoriale qu'il institue et c'est le trait commun des diverses definitions proposdes en doctrine que
de souligner I'absence de tout exclusivisme territorial .... " Id Note that this definition does not
distinguish between the relations among the condomini ("les Etatscondominants," according to the
translation by O'Connell) themselves, and the relations among the condomini and third states since
there obviously exists an "exclusivisme territoriarvis-a-vis those states.
106. See CORET, supranote 2, at 44.
107. See id. at 45-46. "La m~thode utilis6e a consistd Arechercher dans quelle mesure chaque
Etat 'condominant' exerait les compltences sur le territoire soumis au condominium .... D~s
lors, la notion de condominium perdait toute sa sp6cificitd et ne relevait plus que d'une dtude des
compdtences territoriales limitdes . . . ." Id.; see NGUYEN QUOC DINH ET AL., DROrr
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC § 322, at 469 (5th ed. 1994) (defining condominium).
En dtablissant un condominium, deux ou plusieurs Etats accaparent la totalitd des
fonctions dtatiques sur ce territoire et vis-&-vis de l'ensemble des personnes qui
s'y trouvent, et ils s'engagent A exercer les comp6tences dtatiques de faron
colldgiale, en g~ndral sur une base paritaire.
De ce fait, le territoire en question ne peut tomber sous la souverainetd
territoriale de l'un quelconque des Etats qui le g~rent. [By establishing a
condominium, two or more States monopolize the totality of the functions of a
State over this territory and vis-&-vis all the persons living there, and they promise
to exercise State jurisdiction together, usually on an equal basis. Hence, the
territory in question cannot fall under the territorial jurisdiction of any of the
States which administer it.]
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those competences. The closest analogy with private law would probably
be that of the German Gesamrnmte Hand.' It seems that this approach is
but a remnant of the classical theory that saw states as the only creators, or
addressees, of rules of international law. The frst illuminating
contribution to understanding the nature of a condominium comes from
Verdross, even though he wrote on the topic only incidentally. He first
rightly explains that according to the traditional view, the jus gentium
concerned only states."° However, this is just begging the question
because instead of examining the teachings of international practice and
asking which communities such practice considers subjects of international
law, the traditional view makes the dogmatic assumption that only states
are bound by its rules. "' Verdross then observes that "a territory can at the
same time be subject to the territorial jurisdiction of two or more states,
hence, of a community of states."'" Verdross had explained elsewhere the
characteristics of such a community: "There also exist, however, some
countries that are not under the sovereignty of a state, but of a community
of states the number of which may vary. This is the case of
'condominia.','
He further states that it is traditionally thought that a
condominium is a territory placed under the joint authority of two or more
states and thus subject to the different states' rules, which have been issued
by a joint organ." 3 He contends that this hypothesis, however, confuses
the notions of joint organs and internationalorgans, which have to be

108. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 81.
109. Alfred Verdross, Rgles gdndralesdu Droit internationalde la paix, 30 R.C.A.D.I., V,

at 275, 303 (1929).
110. Seeid at321.

D'aprts la doctrine traditionnelle, il est vrai, le droit des gens ne s'adresse
qu'aux Etats seuls. Mais il s'agit ici d'une simple ptition de principe. Car au
lieu d'examiner la conviction de la pratique internationale en se demandant
quelles communautds elle considre comme dtant directement soumises au droit
des gens, la doctrine traditionnelle d~bute par le dogme que seuls les Etats peuvent
etre obliges par ses regles.
Id.

S1I1."[U]n territoire peut 8tre ... soumis i la fois Ala souverainetd territoriale de deux ou
plusieurs Etats, donc d'une communautd d'Etats." Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
112. "I!existe cependant aussi des pays qui ne sont pas sous la souverainetd d'un Ittat, mais
d'une communautd d'ltats plus ou moins large. C'est le cas des 'condominia."' Alfred Verdross,
Lefondement du droit international,16 R.C.A.D.I., I, at 251, 302 (1927).

113. See id. "La doctrine traditionnelle pense qu'un 'condominium' est un territoire placd
sous la domination commune de deux ou de plusieurs Etats, donc qu'il est soumis i des regles de
diffdrents Etats crddes par un organe commun." Id.
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clearly distinguished." 4 "Indeed, any joint organ takes it for granted that
two or more legal orders are individually able to confer a given
competence to the same persons.""' 5 For example, the same man can be
the Head of State of two states, because each one of them is alone
competent to create this function for itself 6 If, on the contrary, a given
competence does not belong to each state, but to several states together, the
states can only exercise this function with the assistance of an international
organ, that is, the organ of the international community composed of these
states.11 Hence, "a country that is ceded to two states together does not
belong to each one of them, [but] it is' a8 territory under the jurisdiction of
an internationalpartialcommunity."

1

The use of the term community leads us to consider states party to the
condominium as members of an organization created by an international
agreement." 9 It should be emphasized from the outset that those member
states stand in a position of legal and functional equality within the
community:

they have the same rights and duties, and this indeed

corresponds to the underlying political context of the establishment of a
condominium. This community does not act through joint organs, since a
joint organ belongs to each of the member states at the same time, and the
condominial territory cannot be considered ajoint territory. If it were, this
would mean that each state party to the condominium could consider this
114. See id. "Mais cette construction confond deux notions qui doivent etre distingu6es
nettement, savoir la notion d'organe commun et celle d'organe international." Id

115. "En effet 1'existence de tout organe commun suppose que deux ou plusieurs ordres
juridiques sont isoldment capables de confdrer aux memes personnes une certaine comp6tence."
Id
116. See id. at 302-03. "Ainsi, deux Etats peuvent donner la compdtence de chef d'Etat...
au meme homme,... parce que chacun d'eux est seul competent A cr6er pour soi-meme cette

fonction." Id
117. See id at 303.

Si par contre une certaine compdtence n'incombe pas Achaque Etat, mais A
plusieurs Etats ensemble, ils ne peuvent exercer cette fonction que par un organe
international, c'est-A-dire un organe qui ne soit pas l'organe commun de ces Etats,
mais l'organe de la communaut6 internationale se composant de ces Etats.
Id
118. "Un pays c~d aux deux Etats ensemble n'est donc pas un territoire de chacun d'eux, il
n'est qu'un territoire sous la competence d'une communautd internationale partielle." Id. Note
that as early as 1920, Thomas J. Lawrence had written that a territory may be held in condominium
where "the powers of sovereignty are exercised conjointly by the governments of the States

concerned; [but it does not mean] that there are two sovereigns in one territory." T.J. LAWRENCE,
A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (9th ed. 1920).
119. We shall consider later whether a customary condominium is conceivable.
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territory to be its own. 120 But it is in the nature of a condominium that no
state can claim for itself the enjoyment and the exercise of competences
over the condominium; those organs are thus internationalin essence.' 2'
Ill-suited as it was when it only dealt with states, the theory of
competences is relevant when applied to the condominial community.
Indeed, accepting that according to international law, the state is not the
only holder of, for example, territorial or personal competences, one
immediately notes that it is, in fact, the condominial community that enjoys
and exercises those competences. This view helps to remove the problem
of condominium from122the notion of a state and from the concomitant
notion of sovereignty.
In Verdross's view, it is possible to link the condominium with the

general theory of the international community, since the world consists of
an integration ofpartial international communities, such as customs unions
and other state compositions, into a full community. " He includes
condominium in the concept of a "communauti d'Etats [community of
States]," exercising state competences. 24 This view also helps exclude the
territorial sovereignty of each of the condomini over the condominium, as
well as that of any third state. Indeed, a partial international condominial
community is meant to enjoy and exercise competences that are usually
120. Governments themselves sometimes have had such a mistaken belief. See infra text
accompanying notes 284-93 for the French view of French jurisdiction over the New Hebrides.
121. Note that those organs are particular organs in the sense that they constitute organs of a
special international law, i.e., condominial law, reflecting the "partial" character of the international
condominial community. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 83. They are either immediate or
mediate. See id. An immediate international organ is designated by the treaty that creates the
condominium and exercises the competence of the community. See id. The international character
of the organ is not prejudiced when member states themselves nominate officials of the
condonimium. See id. This organ is then called "un organe internationalparticulierimmddiat Li

ddsignation indirecte." Id. On the other hand, mediate international organs remain under the
authority of each member state but exercise competences in the condominium on the basis of a
duplication of services See id As such, it is clearly conceivable that condominial law, as a
particular legal system, assigns the exercise of certain competences to a member state.
122. This is a notion that is the characteristic of states. See Advisory Opinion No. 41, Customs
Regime Between Germany and Austria. 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41, at 37 (Sept. 5) (separate
opinion of Judge Anzilotti). "Independence... is really no more than the normal condition of
States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty... by which is meant
that the State has over it no other authority than that of international law." Id at 51; see Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Advisory Opinion of
Apr. 11). "The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature..
• [T*he Court has come to the conclusion that the Organisation is an international person. That
is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not. ... " Id at 178-79.
123. See Verdross, supra note 109, at 396.
124. Id
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vested in states according to international law. 25 The status of a
condominium is thus opposable to third states, for it can "only be created
by respecting the competences attributed by international law to regular
members of the general international community."'26 Hence, one is led to
share the definition of a condominium given by Coret: "Condominium is
the status of a territory where the enjoyment and exercise of the
competences... belong to a partial international community characterized
by the juridical and functional equality of the member states; this
community exercises its competences with
2 7 the help of particular
international organs, immediate or mediate.'
One last issue to resolve is the legal nature of the condominial
community. Whatever definition of international personality one is ready
to endorse, it must be admitted that a condominium cannot have an
international legal personality distinct from that of its member states. 2 In
his classic course at the Hague Academy, Manfredi Siotto-Pintor
distinguished the notion of a person from that of a subject, thus completing
the well-known definition previously given by Judge Anzilotti who saw in
legal personality the capacity to have rights and obligations under

125. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 59.
126. "[C]e statut n'a pu etre cr& que dans le respect des comp~tences attribu6es aux membres
rdguliers de la communautt internationale gdndrale par le droit des gens." CoRET, supranote 2,
at 63. Obviously, this is not the same as saying that the treaty creating a condominium is opposable
to third states, a very controversial theory indeed in international law. It is probably the situation
resulting from the treaty that is opposable. See PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT DES
TRArts § 194, at 116 (3rd ed. 1995). "[B]eaucoup de traitds d6finissent une situation concrete et
quand ii s'agit d'une situation territoriale il est normal que cette situation soit opposable aux autres
Etats .... " [Many treaties deal with a concrete situation, and when a territorial issue is a stake, it
is normal for this situation to be opposable to other States.] Id.; see also South-West Africa, 1950
I.C.J. at 153 (separate opinion of Judge McNair) (stating that occassionally a group of powerful
states or a large number of both great and small states, "assume a power to create by a multipartite
treaty some new international regime or status, which soon acquires a degree of acceptance and
durability extending beyond the limits of the actual contracting parties, and giving it an objective
existence").
127.
Le condominium est le statut d'un territoire i I'tgard duquel la jouissance et
I'exercice des comp6tences reconnues aux Etats par le droit des gens, appartient
A une communautd internationale partielle caractdris6e par l'dgalit juridique et
fonctionnelle des Etats qui en sont membres, cette communautd exergant ses
comp6tences par l'interm6diaire d'organes internationaux particuliers, immddiats
ou m6diats.
CORET, supranote

2, at 55.
128. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 82.
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international law. 129 Verdross himself distinguishes between subjects that

are active and passive, thus creating the norms that address them, from
subjects that are merely passive and do not enjoy international
personality. 30 It is Phillipe Cahier who drew a synthesis of the

characteristics of international personality, including a purpose (le but), an
autonomous will (la volonte), responsibility, powers (les pouvoirs), an
organisation (des organespropres), and the capacity to contribute to the
formation of rules of international law.' 3 ' An international condominial

129. See Manfredi Siotto Pintor, Les sujets de droit international autres que les Etats, 41
R.C.A.D.I., III, at 245, 256-57 (1932). Siotto Pintor stated that personality is "la possiblitd
juridique g~ndrale d'etre titulaire de n'importe quel droit et de n'importe quelle obligation
appartenant Aun domaine juridique donnd [the legal capacity to be the holder of any right and any
obligation under a given legal field]." Id. at 279. He further argued that on the other hand,
subjectivity "embrasse toutes les relations possibles entre une individualitt quelle qu'elle soit et un
ordre juridique [encompasses any possible relation between whichever individuality and a legal
order.]" Id. at 278. As is made clear by Philippe Cahier:
La personne en droit international est celle qui a une competence tr~s g~ndrale,
ou encore la pleine capacitd juridique, la possibiliti de prendre part An'importe
quel rapport juridique.
Le sujet en droit international a au contraire une competence limitde. Il est
sujet en tant que certaines rfgles de droit international s'adressent A lui ....
[A person of international law has a very general competence, a full legal
capacity, the ability to take part in any legal relation.
A subject of international law, on the contrary, has a limited competence, it is
a subject to the extent that some given international legal rules apply to it.]
PHILIPPECAHIER, ETUDES DES ACCORDS DE SItGE ENTRE LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALESET

LES ETATS OU ELLES RksIDENT 38-39

(1959) (footnote omitted). Whether recognition is necessary

can be left aside.
130. COREr, supranote 2, at 58-59; Verdross, supra note 109, at 307-08.
131. See CAHIER, supranote 129, at 42. As a result, a classification is possible:
Les sujets de droit international... [qui] ne possde[nt] pas la totalitd des
caracttristiques ....
Les personnes A capacitd limitde... qui, bien qu'ayant les caractdristiques
.. . de la personnalitd morale, ont, de par leur but limitd, des comp6tences
restreintes ....
Les personnes Apleine capacitd juridique... qui possdent non seulement
toutes les caractdristiques... de la personnalitd morale, mais qui, en plus, de par
leur but tr~s large, ont des comp~tences tr~s gdndrales.
[Subjects of international law.., who do not have all the characteristics.
Persons with limited capacity... who, although they have the characteristics
... of legal personality, have limited competencies because they have a restricted
purpose.
Persons with full legal capacity.., who have not only all the characteristics
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community possesses none of these characteristics and thus has no
international personality distinct from that of its member states, for the
simple reason that it is only through the condomini that the condominium
has access to the international order. For example, a condominum has no
treaty-making power, it cannot participate in the creation of international
norms, and it cannot be held responsible for international wrongful acts.
Only the condomini are the international persons who can perform these
acts. As we have stated, the condominial community enjoys and exercises
state competences, but under condominial law only, which is a particular
international legal order. Due to the lack of international personality of the
condominial community, these competences and the consequences thereof
have to be taken on under general international law by the condomini

themselves. Indeed, with regard to organs, it must be stressed that the
paradox presented by the partial international condominial community is
that although the community has its own international organs under
condominial law, which issue rules for the condominial territory, it has no
permanent organ under international law, and thus is deprived of any legal
responsibility distinct from that of each member state.'3 2 Therefore,
condominial community and the condominial territory are mere passive
subjects of international law in the sense that they can be the addressees of

international rules.'
These conclusions obviously call for further analysis of the
relationship between the condominium and the international legal order in

terms of responsibility, treaty application, and self-determination (an issue
that has never been considered by legal doctrine). They also call for a
clarification of the legal relations between the condominium and the
of legal personality, but who also have very general competencies as a result
of their very broad purpose.]
Id at 41-42.
132. See CORET, supra note 2, at 62.
...

[L]e paradoxe de la communautd internationale partielle condominante est que,
sur le plan de droit condominial, elle dispose bien de ses propres organes
internationaux qui dlaborent les normes destin6es au territoire condominial, alors
que sur le plan du droit des gens elle ne dispose d'aucun organe permanent qui lui
soit propre, ce qui a pour effet de la priver de toute responsabilit6 juridique
distincte de celle de chacun des Etats membres.
Id.

133. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 82. "[lt is in respect of the passive aspect of
international personality that Condominial territory is juridically separate from the respective
metropolitan territories. Treaties of the Condomini do not apply to the territory unless specified."
Id.
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condomini, such as the question of the juridical personality of the
condominium in the domestic legal systems of the condomini."'
II. CONDOMINIA AND RELATED SITUATIONS

A. Condominiaas Distinguishedfrom Other Special Regimes
This section does not purport to make a study of special territorial
regimes, but merely clarifies the notion of a condominium when
confronted with situations that, though related, cannot be assimilated to
cases of condominia. Only those situations involving two or more states,
or possibly persons of international law, will be considered. It would
appear that the best way to distinguish condominia from related situations
is to search where sovereignty is actually vested. When sovereignty is
clearly vested in one state, there is no reason why the theory of
condominium should apply. This is particularly the case of a coimperium,
which has sometimes been equated with a condominium. Imperium was
initially defined as personal jurisdiction as opposed to territorial
jurisdiction, then qualified as dominium. However, international law came
to identify imperium with the exercise of competences over a state's
territory and to separate sovereignty from its exercise. As such, one could
probably share Coret's definition: "A coimperium is a regime in which a
partial international community exercises certain competences over a
portion of the territory of a third state."' 35 However, one must look more
closely at the kind of competences the coimperii, that is, the member states
of the coimperial community, exercise and at the legal powers that remain
vested in the sovereign state. As a consequence, legal doctrine has
sometimes distinguished between coimperium and unequal condominium.
The coimperial community does not include the state in which sovereignty
over the territory is vested, but this state can still exercise sovereign rights
over this territory. On the contrary, the unequal condominial community
includes the nu-souverain, that is, the sovereign that does not exercise
jurisdiction, but this sovereign renounces any exercise of competences.
These theoretical explanations become clearer with concrete cases.
Indeed, one can consider that Bosnia-Herzegovina, from 1878 to 1908, was
placed under the unequal condominium of Austria-Hungary and the

134. See infra part III.
135. "Le coimperium qualifiera donc le r6gime dans lequel une communautt intemationale
partielle exerce certaines comp6tences sur une portion du territoire d'un Etat tiers." CORET, supra
note 2, at 72.
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Ottoman Empire.'36 Article 25 of the Final Act of the Congress of Berlin
recognized that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be "occupied and
administered" by Austria-Hungary, 37 but a subsequent convention ofApril
21, 1879 between the latter and the Sublime Porte stated that Article 25
"'does not prejudice the sovereign right of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan
over these two provinces.' "
In these instances, for all practical purposes
rights of jurisdiction were ceded even though in law sovereignty still
belonged to the nu souverain.39
' On the other hand, one could take the
position that a coimperium existed over the Sudan, as established by the
Anglo-Egyptian convention of January 19, 1899, for sovereignty remained
136. See id at 105; 1 OPPENHEIM,supra note 81, § 171, at 411.

137. COREr, supra note 2, at 105.
138. "'ne port[e] pas atteinte au droit de souverainetd de Sa Majestd Implriale le Sultan sur
ces deux provinces."' Id.at 106.
139. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 81, § 171, at 411. Actually, "[a] nominal sovereignty is not
totally devoid of practical consequences." Id. Thus, in Lighthouses in Crete andSamos (Greece
v. Turk.), 1937 P.C..J.(ser. A/B) No. 71, at 94 (Oct. 8), the P.C.I.J. held that, regardless of the
autonomy that Turkey had given to the islands of Crete and Samos, these territories still were under
Turkish sovereignty in 1913, therefore Turkey could "properly grant or renew concessions with
regard to these islands." 1 OPPENHEIM, supranote 81, § 171, at 411; see Lighthouses in Crete and
Samos, 1937 P.C.I.J. at 103-06. Judge Hudson in his dissenting opinion stated that "a ghost of
hollow sovereignty cannot be permitted to obscure the realities of this situation." Lighthouses in
Crete andSamos, 1937 P.C.I.J. at 127 (Hudson, J., dissenting). The question of the separation of
sovereignty from its exercise and of so-called restrictions of sovereignty also covers the situation
of leases, concessions, military bases, and so-called state servitudes, where the holder of
sovereignty, contrary to what has sometimes been asserted, is clearly identifiable. See Lauterpacht,
supra note 48, § 92, at 325 (leases); Arnold D. McNair, So-Called State Servitudes, 1925 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. I11, 111-12 (servitudes) (discussing NorthAtlantic FisheriesArbitration, 11 R.I.A.A.
at 181-82). But see Dutch Mining,Supreme Courtof Cologne (1914), 8 AM.J. INT'L L. 858 (1914).
[C]ertains en sont arrives i analyser ces baux comme des cessions ddguisdes.
Mais les baux dtaient et sont tr~s loin d'etre cela. Ils n'auraient pas t6 des
cessions meme si la souverainetd du 'cddant' dtait restde purement nominale.
Mais cette souverainetd est plus que nominale, et s'exprime, dans certains cas, par
la continuation de l'exercice par le 'c6dant' de quelques droits juridictionnels ou,
dans d'autres cas, par la reconnaissance de la adcessit6 de son consentement au
transfert de la concession. [Some people have come to considering these leases
disguised cessions. But this is far from being what the leases were, and still, are.
They could not have been cessions even if the sovereignty of the 'assignor' had
remained nominal. However, this sovereignty is more than nominal and, in some
cases, it is expressed by the continued exercise by the 'assignor' of some rights of
jurisdiction or, in other cases, by the acknowledgment of the necessity of its assent
to the transfer of the concession.]
Lauterpacht, supra note 48, at 325. The relations of sovereignty to its attributes is a very complex
question, which need not be tackled in this article.
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vested in the Ottoman Empire. " The Convention provided for a" 'system
for the administration of and for the making of laws"' in the Sudan in its
preamble, stated that "'the Egyptian flag together with the British flag
shall be used throughout the Sudan,"' and stated in Article 3 that "'[t]he
Supreme military and civil command in the Sudan shall be vested in...
the "Governor-General of the Sudan,"... appointed by Khedival Decree
on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty.' ,141However, it must
be stressed that Egypt was not competent at that time to conclude such a
treaty.44
The Khedive's authority in Egypt and in the Sudan was
restricted in the firmans 43 As such, the Empire never recognized the
regime established in the Sudan and was thus not part of the coimperial
community, which only enjoyed a de facto existence.'"
Condominium also has to be distinguished from cases of collective
protectorate, which can be distinguished from a coimperium by the fact
that the latter is usually exercised on a portion of territory, while the former
concerns the whole of a territory and theoretically only affects its external
relations. 45 Such was the case of Samoa. According to Moye, the Treaty
of Berlin of 14 June 1889 between Germany, Great Britain, and the United
States created the following situation:
None of the powers can exercise exclusive control, and the
independence of the Samoan Government, as well as the right
of the natives to chose their King, [is] solemnly
proclaimed . .

.

. But [the Treaty] contains a series of

measures which make the local government completely
subordinate .... . One should [also] go a step further and

admit the right of the States Signatories to interfere with the
foreign affairs of the archipelago. The Treaty does not
expressly say so, but the intention is quite clear."

140. See EL-ERLAN, supranote 1, at 147-48.
141. Id.at 163-65 (quoting 1899 Convention, 84 British & Foreign State Papers [B.F.S.P.],
at 638).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 162.
144. See id.
145. The distinction becomes somewhat blurred when it comes to small territories such as the
Free City of Dantzig.
146.
Aucune des puissances ne peut exercer de contr6le exclusif, et l'ind6pendance du
gouvernement samoan, le droit des naturels A se choisir leur Roi, sont
traitd] 6dicte une sdrie de mesures qui
solennellement proclamds ....Mais [le
rendent la position du gouvernement local absolument subordormd ....I1faut
[aussi] aller plus loin et admettre le droit d'immixtion des Etats cosignataires dans
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The theory of condominium has sometimes wrongfully been applied
to frontier zones jointly exploited by the neighboring states. Such is the
case of the guano deposits in the Mechillones, located in the Atacama
desert and jointly exploited by Chile and Bolivia. According to the 1866
Treaty of Santiago, the profits were divided in two, but the frontier was
clearly delimited.
Nonstate territories submitted to collective administration are too
easily taken for condominia. Such is the case of Andorra. The Valleys of
Andorra in the Pyrenees were placed by the Pariage47 of 1278 under the
joint suzerainty of the French Count of Foix and the Spanish Bishop of
Urgel.' 48 These rights passed to the French Crown in 1620, and then to the
French State as such.' 49 The President of the French Republic merely
exercises his rights on behalf of the state, contrary to the common view
that sees him as Prince of Andorra. However, the rights of the Bishop of
Urgel, a mere individual, never passed to Spain. In accordance with the
Pariage,the vassals were to pay an annual tribute to the co-suzerains who
in turn would nominate a viguier to represent them in the Valleys. In
Radio Andorre, the Commissaire du Gouvernement Odent said:
The Valleys ofAndorra have no international status. They are
not a State, even protected or vassal, nor are they a person of
international law. There is no treaty or convention between
France and the Valleys of Andorra, neither can there be one
The Valleys are a fief, enjoying the franchises that
....
feudal law accorded to fiefs and over which the dual
suzerainty of a Spanish bishop and France is exercised ....
Since the mitre of Urgel, the other suzerain, like the territory
of Andorra, does not have any international existence, it
necessarily ensues that France, and France alone, bears
international responsibility for the Valleys of Andorra. 5°

les affaires extdrieures de l'archipel. Le texte du traitd n'en parle pas, mais
l'intention est dvidente.
M. Moye, La question des ies Samoa, 6 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
[R.G.D.I.P.] 125, 136 (1899).
147. Pardageis a treaty giving joint and equal rights.
148. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 89; Schneider, supra note 7, at 58.
149. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 58.
150.
[Lies valles d'Andorre n'ont pas de statut international. Elles ne constitutent pas

un Etat, ne serait-ce que protdgd ou vassal, ni une personne de droit international.
I! n'y a pas et ne peut pas y avoir entre la France et les vall6es d'Andorre de traitd
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

29

Florida Journal of FLORIDA
International
Law,
Vol. 12, Iss. 1LAW
[1998], Art. 3
JOURNAL
OFINTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 12.

Another case of administration of nonstate territory is that of
mandates, trusts, and nonself-governing territories. The question posed by
the allocation of sovereignty, particularly with regard to mandates, has
created a great deal of disagreement among writers.'51 Five interpretations
have been suggested: title in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,
title in the League of Nations, title in the Mandatory Powers, title in the
League of Nations together with the Mandatory Powers, and title in the
inhabitants of the Mandated territories.'52 Cases of condominium have
been imagined for all of these interpretations, but in fact only the first
holds, since the territories therein were held in condominium before the
establishment of the Mandates, that is, pending the functioning of the
League of Nations.' 53 Indeed, according to Article 119 of the Treaty of
Versailles, "Germany renounce[d] in favour of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas
possessions."'" In fact, "the interpretation that is gaining ground now is

ou de convention . .

.

. Les valles d'Andorre sont un fief, jouissant des

franchises que le droit fdodal acordait aux fiefs, et sur lesquels s'exerce la double
suzerainetd d'un dveque espagnol et de la France.. . . Et comme la mitre
d'[Ulrgel, l'autre suzerain, n'a pas davantage que le territoire d'Andorre
d'existence internationale, ils'ensuit ncessairement que la France et la France
seule a la responsabilitd intemationale des vallOes d'Andorre.
CORET, supranote 2, at 95-96 (quoting Radio-Andorre,2 fdvrier, Trib. conflits 1950, Lebon 1950,

at 652 (Fr.)). This view was also expressed in an older case, Vives, Cass. crim., May 12, D. 1859,
D.P.1. 1859, V., 89 (Fr.). CORET, supra note 2, at 95. And also was expressed in a subsequent
case, Cruzel v. Massip, Dec. 6, Trib. Perpignan 1951, 1953 Revue du Droit Public [R.D.P.], 1102
(Fr.). CORET, supra note 2, at 96.
151. See EL-ERIAN, supra note I, at 112.
152. Seeid at 112-13.
153. See Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles:
To those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late war, have
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed
them, .

.

. there should be applied the principle that the well-being and

development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization ....
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage
of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations,... and that this tutelage
should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
Treaty of Peace, Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919,
Versailles, art. 22, 1919 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 (Cmd. 153) [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
154. Id. art. 119; see Verdross, supra note 112, at 303-04. "[I]l est clair que d'aprbs l'article
119 la souverainetd sur ces territoires a &tA transfdre aux Puissances Principales. Celles-ci dtaient
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the one which, as a point of departure rejects . ..the concept of
sovereignty."'" In his Separate Opinion in South-West Africa, Judge
McNair wrote a follows:
[T]he mandates system (and the "corresponding
principles" of the International Trusteeship System) is a new
institution - a new relationship between territory and its
inhabitants on the one hand and the government which
represents them internationally on the other - a new species
of international government, which does not fit into the old
conception of sovereignty ....Sovereignty in a mandated
territory is in abeyance; if and when the inhabitants of the
territory obtain recognition as an independent
state,
15 6
sovereignty will revive and vest in [that] state.
As one author has aptly remarked,
[t]he question of exactly where sovereignty over a trust
territory rests is being reduced to one of sterility. Irrespective
of where sovereignty may rest, a practical method has now
been worked out and approved by the General Assembly for
the placing of former mandated territories under trusteeship;
and trusteeship may be lawfully terminated under the Charter
by the grant of self-government or independence.'

cependant oblig6es par l'article 22 du Pacte de transformer ces pays en Mandats de la Socidtd des
Nations. De fait, elles ont conclu des trait6s avec les Etats mandataires confirm6s par le Conseil
de la Socidt6 des Nations ....
" [It is clear from Article 119 that sovereignty over these territories
has been transferred to the Principal Powers. However, they were bound by Article 22 of the
Covenant to transform these countries into Mandates of the League of Nations. Hence, they have
made treaties with the Mandatories which were confirmed by the Council of the League ofNations.]
Id
155. EL-ERIAN, supra note 1,at 113. This is especially true if one considers the Mandates as

being under the sovereignty of the Mandatories or the League of Nations. See, e.g.,. South-West
Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 128; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
156. South-West Afirica, 1950 I.C.J. at 150 (Separate Opinion of Judge McNair).
157. Francis B. Sayre, Legal ProblemsArisingfrom the UnitedNations Trusteeship System,

42 AM. J. INT'L L. 262, 271-72 (1948).
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B. The Classificationof CondominiaAccording to Coret
1. Frontier Condominia
Contrary to what has often been asserted, condominia are not mere
provisory, dangerous, territorial settlements, since most of them lasted over
a century or are still in existence. 5 8 However, it is true that a condominium
can be a convenient means of settling a territorial dispute based on
conflicting claims (which shows that a condominium is one out many
pacific means of dispute settlement).' 59 This is particularly true of
condominia that are established on a disputed frontier.
a. The Island of the Conference (Annex, Fig. 6)
The condominium over the Island of the Conference, located close to
the mouth of the river Bidassoa, was established by Spain and France in the
Treaty of Bayonne of 2 December 1856, which was intended to delimit the
border between both countries."6 Article 27 provides:
The Island of Faisans [the Pheasants], also known as the
Island of the Conference, 6 which evokes so many historical

158. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 6-7;

SIBERT,

supra note 84, § 251.

[I]l arrive que 1a convention des parties, domin6es par les contingences politiques,
d~truise les exigences de la raison. IIne manque pas de s'ensuivre des heurts et
des discussions parfois aigues: la guerre meme pet surgir. Si bien que le
condominium, situation de compromis et d'attente, ne semble pas en rdalit6 un
procdd6 qui soit tr~s Arecommender. [It sometimes happens that the convention
between Parties dominated by political contingencies runs against reason. Then,
clashes and fraught discussions necessarily follow: even war can break out.
Hence condominium, which is a temporary regime of compromise, is actually not
a method to be recommended].
Id. But see Lauterpacht , supra note 48, at 322. "[L]a doctrine classique ne pouvait admettre
juridiquement le condominium que par une sorte de dMtour et en le considdrant comme un
arrangement provisoire avant d6volution finale du territoire." [The traditional view could only
admit condominium within a legal framework by considering it a provisory settlement before the
final attribution of the territory]. Id.
159. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 6-7.
160. See CORET, supra note 2, at 135.
161. One should note that there actually exist two islands, one called the Island of the Faisans,
or the Island of the Conference; only over this island is the condominium established. See Jacques
Descheemaeker, Unefrontire inconnue: les Pyriniesde l'Ocian 'Aragon,47/49 R.G.D.I.P.
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remembrances common to both nations, will belong jointly
[par indivis] to France and Spain.
The respective authorities of the border will consult
together over the prosecution of any offence committed on
this island.
Both Governments will take, by common agreement, the
measures appropriate to preserve this island from the looming
destruction" and will share the costs
63 of the works that are
deemed useful to its conservation.
The exercise of competences by both powers is regulated by a 1901
Convention, which will be discussed later.'
b. Districtof Moresnet (Annex, Fig.2)
The district of Moresnet was not included in the Act of Congress of
Vienna of 9 June 1815 when it came to establish a frontier between Prussia
and the Netherlands. 65 These states disagreed on the construction to be
given to the boundary provisions, and both claimed the district.'6 On June
26, 1816, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle established the condominium of
Prussia and the Netherlands on Moresnet. 6 Article 17 provides:
"Since both commissions [of delimitation] have been unable
to agree upon the way in which the small part of the canton of
239, 249 (1940-45).
162. Indeed, the island was endangered by the quarrying of gravel.
163.
"L'ile des Faisans, connue aussi sous le nom d'ile de la Conffirence, Alaquelle
se rattachent tant de souvenirs historiques communs aux deux nations,
appartiendra par indivis Ala France etA l'Espagne.
Les autoritds respectives de la frontire s'entendront pour la r6pression de tout
d~lit qui serait commis sur le sol de cette lie.
Les deux gouvemements prendront, d'un commun accord, toutes les mesures
qui leur paraltront convenables pour preserver cette fle de la destruction qui la
menace, et par l'exdcution, Afrais communs, des travaux qu'ils jugeront utiles A
sa conservation."
CORET, supra note 2, at 136 (quoting Treaty of Bayonne, 2 Dec. 1856, art. 27 (Spain-Fr.)).
164. See id.
165. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 126. Article 25 provided that "His Majesty the King of
Prussia shall also possess in full property and sovereignty, the countries on the left bank of the
Rhine included in the frontier.. . " but no mention was made of Moresnet. CORET, supranote 2,
at 147-48.
166. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 126.
167. See id at 126-27.
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shall belong to Prussia would be
This question shall be submitted to the

respective governments so that they may take a decision ....
In the meantime, the temporary border shall consist of the
town of Moresnet, so that the part of this town which is
located on the left-hand side of a straight line to be drawn
from the point of intersection between the three cantons to the
point of intersection between the three administrative
divisions [i.e., Ourthe, Lower Meuse and Roehr], will in any
case belong to the Kingdom of Prussia; that the part on the
right-hand side of a line to be drawn from the limits of the
canton of Eupen, directly from the south to the north, to the
same point of intersection between the three administrative
districts, will also in any case belong to the Kingdom of
Prussia; and, finally, that the part of the above-mentioned
town which is locatedbetween these lines, being the only one
which can reasonably be contested,will be subject to ajoint
administration,and
shall not be militarilyoccupiedby any of
6
the two powers."1 1
By the Treaty of London of 19 April 1839, the Netherlands was
succeeded by Belgium as the co-partner of Prussia (later on Germany) in
the Moresnet condominium. 69 The latter was ended by the Treaty of
Versailles, Article 32: "Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of
Belgium over the whole of the contested [this expression is incorrect, since

168.

"[Iles deux Commissions [of delimitation] n'ayant pu s'entendre sur la manitre
dont serait coup6e la petite partie du canton d'Aubel qui... doit appartenir au
royaume de Prusse. Cette difficultd sera soumise Ala decision des gouvernements
respectifs ....En attendant cette d6cision, la frontier provisoire sera form6e par

la Commune de Moresnet, de maniere que la partie de cette commune, situ6e i
gauche d'une ligne droite i tirer du point de contact des trois cantons sur le point
de contact des trois d6partements [Ourthe, Meuse infdrieure, Roehr],appartiendra
dans tous ls cas au royaume des Pays-Bas; que celle situ6e &droite d'une ligne
i tirer des limites du canton d'Eupen directement du Sud au Nord, sur le mme
point de contact des trois d6partements appartiendra 6galement dans tous les cas
au royaume de Prusse, et qu 'enfin. lapartie de ceute mime commune situde entre
ces deux lignes, comme itant la seule quipuisse itre raisonnablementcontestde,
sera soumise h une administration commune, et ne pourra itre occupie
militairement par aucune des deux puissances."
note 2,at 148.
169. See id. at 148-49.

CORET, supra
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the territory was not 'contested' but
condominial] territory of Moresnet
70
(also called 'neutral Moresnet').'9
c. The "FrontierStreams" (Annex, Fig.5)
The possibility of a condominium over water was expressly
acknowledged by Oppenheim.' 71 Under the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, a
condominium was established between the Netherlands and Prussia over
the "frontier streams" in an area located on the right bank of the river
Meuse and along the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.'7 Article 27 of the
Treaty reads as follows:
"Unless otherwise stipulated, wherever brooks, streams, or
rivers are boundaries, they will be common to both States ....
There shall be no changes in the flow of the rivers, neither in
the banks, and no concession or right to draw water shall be
granted without the participation and consent of both
governments; the same will apply to ditches, channels, paths,
canals, hedges, or any other object used as a limit, i.e. the
sovereignty over these objects will be common to both
powers.
Catch will also be common and will continue
to be sold
' 73
by public auction on behalf of both States.'

170. Id at 149 (quoting Treaty of Versailles, supra note 153, at art. 32).
171. See I OPPENHEIM, supra note 81, § 171, at 409.
172. CoREr, supra note 2, at 142; EL-ERiAN, supra note I, at 133.
173.
"Partout ot) des ruisseaux, rivi~res ou fleuves feront limites, ils
seront communs
aux deux Etats, &moins que le contraire ne soit positivement stipuld .... I!ne
pourra etre fait ni au cours des rivi~res, ni A l'dtat actuel des bords aucune
innovation quelconque, ni etre accordd aucune concession ou prise d'eau sans le
concours et le consentement des deux gouvemements; ilen sera de meme des
fossd% rigoles, chemins, canaux, hayes ou tout autre objet servant de limites, c'est-dire que ces objets quant A leur souverainetd seront communs aux deux
Puissances ....
La peche sera dgalement commune et continuera d'etre adjug6e publiquement
pour le compte des deux Etats. . .
COREr, supra note 2, at 142-43.
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One should immediately note that islands themselves were not affected by
this regime. 7 4 This condominium was upheld in a case before the German
Supreme Court in 1932.'
d The Gulfof Fonseca (Annex, Fig. 4)
In 1914, a dispute between El Salvador and Nicaragua arose out of the
conclusion of a treaty by the latter with the Government of the United
States, known as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of August 5, 1914.76 This
treaty related, inter alia, to the leasing, for ninety-nine years, of a naval base
in the Gulf of Fonseca, the riparian states of which were Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Honduras. 7 El Salvador held that the treaty was "highly
prejudicial to her supreme interests," and violated her rights of coownership in the Gulf.'78 Nicaragua contended that the Gulf was a bay
owned exclusively by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, but only as

174. See id. at 143.
175. See id. at 144; EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 133-34. The appellant operated a mill on a
stream that formed the boundary between Germany and the Netherlands. See id. at 134. He drew
water from the stream for use in his mill and applied for registration of these water rights as
provided for in the German Water Act. See id.The application was refused by the District
Committee, whose decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court. See id.
The Court argued that "[the] Agreement of 181 6 created ajoint ownership under international law,
a so-called Condominium, according to which both contracting states exercised ajoint jurisdiction
over frontier streams, [and therefore] the jurisdiction of each state was limited by that of the other
state." See id. The Court held as follows: "'Seeing that the Prussian State did not enjoy
unrestricted jurisdiction over the stream, the German Water Act was therefore not applicable to
frontier streams which were subject to the joint jurisdiction of Prussia and the Netherlands."' See
id. at 135 (quoting Supreme Administrative Court, Nov. 24, 1932, Reichs und Preussiches
Verwaltungsblatt, vol. 55, at 528 (1934)).
As aptly noted by Coret:
[C]an we still speak of "ownership" Lpropridte'J, even under international law,
when it implies a right ofjurisdiction? ...Furthermore, each State's jurisdiction
is not limited in this case by that of the other one, for there is no limitation, there
is only a total absence of jurisdiction of one Signatory or the other, which the
Court recognises almost verging on contradiction when it declares that the frontier
streams are subject to the joint jurisdiction of Prussia and the Netherlands.
CORET,supra note

2, at 145.

176. See JudicialDecisionsInvolving Questions of InternationalLaw: The Republic of El
Salvador v. The Republic of Nicaragua (Central Am. Ct. of Just.), I1 AM. J.INT'L L. 674, 674
(1917) [hereinafter El Salvador Case].
177. See id. at 674-75.
178. Id. at 675.
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to the maritime territorial part that belonged to them respectively as owners
of their coasts, in their respective parts. 79
The dispute over the legal status of the Gulf was submitted to the
Central American Court of Justice, which rendered its judgment on March
2, 1917.10 The Gulf of Fonseca was under Spanish authority from its
discovery in 1522 until 1827, and then it was under the sovereignty of the
Federal Republic of the Center of America until to 1839.'"l In the same
year, when the Federation came to an end, the three riparian states "in their
character of autonomous nations and legitimate successors of Spain,
incorporated [the Gulf] into their respective territories, as a necessary
dependency thereof for geographical reasons and purposes of common
defense."' 2 The parties acknowledged that the riparian countries of the
83
Gulf were not demarcated until they became sovereign states.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that these states had ever successfully
divided all the waters in the Gulf.IU Even though a line had been drawn
between Honduras and Nicaragua in 1900, it only went as far as a point
midway between Tigre Island and Cosigilina Point. 5 No division had
been completed between El Salvador and Nicaragua.'
Thus, with the
exception of the above mentioned part, the Court concluded that the
remaining waters of the Gulf were undivided and in "a state of community"
between the parties.' 87
The Central American Court of Justice qualified the Gulf as a
"historic bay," since it was of paramount importance to the riparian States
that have affirmed their peaceful ownership and possession in the Gulf

179. See id. at 688.
180. See id.at 674.
181. See id.at 700.
182. Id.
183. Seeid. at711.
184. See id.
185. See id
186. See id. at 710.
187. Id. at 711. The I.C.J. later explained in Land, Islandand Maritime FrontierDispute
(Merits) (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 1992 I.C.J §§ 351, 400,405 (Sept. 11):
[The] three States jointly inherited by succession waters which for nearly three
centuries had been under the single sway of the State from which they were the
heirs; and in which waters there were no maritime administrative boundaries at the
time of inheritance .... A joint succession of the three States to the maritime
areas seems in these circumstances to be the logical outcome of the principle of
utipossidetisjurisitself.
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without protest by any nation whatsoever. m8 The waters in the Gulf were
thus described as "territorial waters,"' 9 under the sole and undivided
ownership of the three countries. "One coparcener cannot lawfully alter,
or deliver into the hands of an outsider, or even share with it, the use and
enjoyment of the thing held in common... ."
However, the parties
were agreed, and so accepted the Court, that there existed a "littoral marine
league" (a three-mile zone contiguous to the coast), which was the
exclusive property of each state.19 ' The Court also recognized a further
zone of nine nautical miles as a zone of rights of inspection and the
exercise of police lower for fiscal purposes and for national security 92
(each state possessing therefore a right of imperium in these waters).'93 The
Court also said that merchant vessels of third states enjoyed a right of uso
innocente in the nonlittoral waters of the Gulf, that is, those waters not
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of each riparian state.'"
In 1992, in a case opposing Honduras and El Salvador, a Chamber of
the I.C.J. paralleled the opinion of the Court as to the particular regime of
the historic waters of the Gulf. It found that "the Gulf waters, other than
the 3-mile maritime belts, are historic waters and subject to a joint

188. El SalvadorCase, supra note 176, at 707.
189. Id. at 717. The Court endorsed Drago's comment on North Atlantic Fisheries
Arbitration, 11 R.I.A.A. at 173, in his dissent:
[A]s a general rule[,] ... the marginal belt of territorial waters should follow the

sinuosities of the coast, so that the marginal belt being of three miles, only such
bays should be held as territorial as have an entrance not wider than six miles [the
waters seaward of the belt usually being considered high seas].

But this refers to common or ordinary bays, and not to those which, in our
dissent, we have called "historic bays." As has been seen, the principle that
underlies all the rules and jurisdictional distances is no other than that of
paramount necessity to protect fiscal interests, persons and territory of the nation

that claims sovereignty over the contiguous seas and over the gulfs, bays, and
coves that penetrate its coast line.
El Salvador Case, supranote 176, at 708.
190. El SalvadorCase, supra note 176, at 712.
191. Id. at711.
192. See id at 715.
193. Seeid at711.
194. See id at 715.
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sovereignty of the three coastal States.' 9 5 As to the meaning of "territorial
waters" in the 1917 Judgment, the Chamber stated:
[The term "territorial waters" was, 75 years ago, not
infrequently used to denote what would now be called
"internal" or "national" waters. To have recognized exclusive
"maritime belts" along the littoral inside those "territorial
waters," the property of the three States in common, was no
doubt an anomaly in terms of the modem law of the sea; but
it was in accord with what had emerged from actual practice
of the coastal States in the Gulf of Fonseca at that time, and
was perhaps also a remnant of the view that the maritime belt
in a pluri-State bay, followed the sinuosities of the coast, the
remainder of the bay waters being high seas."9
The Chamber noted that the right of innocent passage was at odds with the
present legal status of the waters of a bay as constituting internal waters,
whether the waters were of a juridical bay or one that had arisen from a
historic title. However, the court continued:
[T]he rules which normally apply to "bays the coasts of which
belong to a single State" are not necessarily appropriate to a
bay which is a pluri-State bay ....
The Gulf waters are
therefore, if indeed internal waters, internal waters subject to
a special and particular regime, not only ofjoint sovereignty
but of rights of passage. It might, therefore, be sensible, to
regard the waters of the Gulf, insofar as they are the 9subject
of
7
the condominium or co-ownership, as sui generis.1
It should also be noted that the Chamber remarked that it was possible to
establish a condominium by other means than a treaty.
[I]t is true that condominium as term of art in international
law usually indicates just such a structured system for the joint
exercise of sovereign governmental powers over a territory; a
situation that might more aptly be called co-imperium. But

195. See Merits, 1992 I.C.J. REPORTS § 404. As to the 1900 Honduras/Nicaragua partial
delimitation, the Chamber noted that El Salvador emphasized that it was not binding on El
Salvador. See id However, since the latter country was bound by the 1917 Judgment, which had

acknowledged the 1900 delimitation, the Chamber concluded that the existence of the delimitation
had been accepted by El Salvador. See id.
196. Id § 392.
197. Id §§ 393, 412.
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this is not what the Central American Court of Justice had in
mind. By a condominium they clearly meant to indicate the
existence of a joint sovereignty arising as a juridical
consequence of the succession of 1821.9'
As to the legal status of the waters seaward of the closing line of the
gulf, the Chamber noted that since the legal situation on the landward side
of the closing line was one ofjoint sovereignty, it followed that all three of
the joint sovereigns must have entitlement outside the closing line to the
territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. Whether
this situation should remain, or be replaced by a division and delimitation
into three separate zones was, as it also was regarding inside the Gulf, a
matter for the three states to decide.' 99
2. Colonial Condominia
a. The Canton and EnderburyIslands
Canton lies approximately 1850 miles southwest of Hawaii, and
Enderbury lies 32 miles southeast of Canton.2" Both are members of the
Phoenix Islands group, which had been claimed by Great Britain since
1892.20 ' The first accuratemap of the islands was drawn by the Americans
198. Id § 404. According to the present writer, this reasoning, clearly inspired by the private
law of succession is highly susceptible to criticism, not only because the Chamber simply endorsed
the view that the absence of demarcation results in the condominium situation in a state succession
situation, but also because the private law analogy misses the point that heirs always expressly or
tacitly approve of their inheriting from the testator. However, the Chamber noted that "Honduras
oppos[ed] the condominium idea and accordingly call[ed] in[to] question the correctness of this
part of the 1917 Judgment .... Nicaragua, the intervening State, which was a party to the 1917
proceedings, [wals and ha[d] consistently been opposed to the condominium solution." Id. § 398.
With regard to the 1917 Judgment, the Chamber said that it was a valid decision of a competent
court, thus having the status of resjudicata between El Salvador and Nicaragua. See id. § 403.
With regard to the proceedings before the Chamber, the latter stated that "the question of the
existence or not of a resjudicata arising from a case with two parties is not helpful in a case raising
a question of a joint sovereignty of three coastal States." Id. Also note that the Chamber
alternatively considered a condominium as joint sovereignty, joint exercise of sovereign
governmental powers, and even a co-imperium. See id. These are notions based on the sovereignty
concept and we rejected them as definitions of a condominium.
199. See id. § 420. Thisjudgment was heavily criticised by Judge Oda, who in his Dissenting
Opinion admitted that he had difficulties in understanding the legal concepts forged by the
Chamber. See id § 760 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda); see also lain Scobbie, The .C.J. and
the Gulf ofFonseca: When Two Implies Three but Entails One, 18 MAR. POL'Y 249-62 (1994).
200. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 144.
201. See id.
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between 1838 and 1842.202 By virtue ofthe the Act of 1856, approximately
one hundred islands, rocks, and keys in the Caribbean and the Pacific were
put under U.S. jurisdiction. 3
The United States claimed title over Canton and Enderbury under the
Guano Act of 1856, whereas Great Britain annexed the islands and then
incorporated them within the Phoenix Group for administrative purposes,
2 4 The Phoenix Group was
pretending that they were terra nullius.
included as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony by Order in
Council of 1937.205 Early in 1938, President Roosevelt issued an Executive
Order that put Canton and Enderbury under the administrative control of
the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.2 6 In 1938, negotiations between the two
governments were successfully concluded, and by an exchange of notes,
dated April 6, 1939, the two countries entered into an agreement regarding
the islands. 2°7 This agreement provides as follows:
1. The Government of the United States and the Government
of the United Kingdom, without prejudice to their respective
claims to Canton and Enderbury Islands, agree to a joint
control over these islands.
2. The Islands shall, during the period of joint control, be
administered by a United States and a British official
appointed by their respective Governments.
6. An airport may be constructed and operated on Canton
Island by an American company or companies, satisfactory to
the United States Government, which, in return for an agreed
fee, shall provide facilities for British aircraft and British civil
aviation companies ....
7. The joint control ... shall have a duration of fifty years
from this day's date. If no agreement to the contrary is
reached before the expiration of that period the joint control
shall continue thereafter until such time as it may be modified
or terminated by the mutual consent of the two
Governments. "°

202. See J.S. Reeves, Agreement over Canton andEnderbury Islands, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 521,
523 (1939).
203. See id. at 524.
204. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 144-45; Reeves, supra note 202, at 523.
205. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 145.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Reeves, supra note 202, at 522.
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b. The Sudan (1936-1956)
As previously mentioned, under the 1899 Agreement, the Sudan
qualified as a coimperium. Therefore, one should turn to the years 19141956 to inquire whether there really was a condominium over the Sudan
during that period. By the Treaties of S~vres and Lausanne, Turkey had to
give up all her rights and titles over the Sudan by November 5, 1914.2" In
1915, Great Britain proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt. 2 '° From that date
onward, the status of the Sudan was defined by the relations between Great
Britain and Egypt. On February 28, 1922, the British government ended
its Protectorate over Egypt, declaring Egypt to be an independent sovereign
state.2 1 However, some issues were reserved for future agreement, that 2is,
12
the status quo was preserved, including the status of the Sudan.
Consequently, the Sudan cannot be considered as having been under an
Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 1922 onwards, for there surely existed
a legal and functional inequality between Great Britain and Egypt. Hence,
one has to recognize the Sudan "as a territory that belongs to an unequal
partialinternationalcommunity: the community that exists between Great
Britain and Egypt after the declaration of 28 February 1922. ''2I3
The relations between Great Britain and Egypt were finally regulated
by a treaty of friendship and alliance, signed on August 16, 1936, which
was motivated by Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.214 The treaty addressed the
status of the Sudan:
1. While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in the
future modifying the agreements of the 19th of January and
the I 0th of July, 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that
the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be that
resulting from the said agreements. The Governor-General
shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High
Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said
agreements.

209.
210.
211.
212.

See
See
See
See

EL-ERIAN, supra note I, at 161.
MEKKI ABBAS, THE SUDAN QUEsTION 57 (1952).
EL-ERIAN, supranote 1, at 183.
id

213. "conme un territoire A I'6gard duquel la jouissance et l'exercice des compitences

appartiennentt une communautiinternationalepartielle
indgalitaire.Cette communautd est celle
qui existe entre 'Angleterre et 'Egypte apr~s la d~claration du 28 fdvrier 1922." CORET, supra
note 2, at 167.
214. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 186.
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Nothing in this Article prejudices the question of the
sovereignty of the Sudan.
5. There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan among
British subjects and Egyptian nationals with regard to
commerce, immigration or acquisition of property.
6. The High Contracting Parties agree on the provisions
contained in the Annex of the present Article relating to the
method according to which international conventions will be
applicable to the Sudan.2"
What is the value of the provision on sovereignty? This cannot be
construed as meaning that sovereignty over the Sudan might be vested in
a third state, or that it is simply in abeyance. In fact, the 1936 agreement
had created a genuine partial international condominial community
enjoying state competences over the Sudan. The provision only sought not
to prejudice the future relations of the condomini and the condominium,
should one member of the community later acquire sovereignty over the
condominial territory. Furthermore, the mention of the maintenance of the
1899 regime was a legal absurdity, for the condominial community was
now characterized by the equality of its members, as shown by the Annex
to Article 11 on the negotiation of agreements procedure. From 1948
onwards, the regime was tainted by unilateral initiatives by the condomini
to put an end to the condominium. In an agreement of February 12, 1953,
both countries agreed on the existence of a right of self-determination for
the Sudanese people and established a transitory period leading to
independence; the latter was proclaimed by the Sudanese Parliament on
January 1, 1956.
c. The New Hebrides (Annex, Fig. 1)
The New Hebrides islands have been made remarkable by their
geographic situation in the Western Pacific. 216 In 1825, sandalwood was
discovered on Erromango and a trade thereof was organized from Sidney
by lawless Europeans who instigated native wars and massacres.1 7
Presbyterian missionaries arrived in 1848 and after the appearance of
Marist missionaries, began a struggle with France for influence in the

215. Id. at 186-87 (quoting 1936 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, art. 11, 1936 BR. Y.B.
INT'LL. 18,91).

216. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 71.
217. See id. at 71-72.
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islands. 8 In the 1850s, the growing number of French settlers led to
numerous calls for French annexation,21 9 while the British government was
implicated by Australian investment. In 1878, Britain and France
acknowledged that the Australian public and the settlers on the islands
were increasingly discontent with the situation.22 Both governments
agreed not to affect "what was ambiguously referred to as the
'independence' of the Group., 22 ' However, in 1882, the formation of the
French Compagnie Calidoniennedes Nouvelles Hibrideswas a definitive
act toward an overwhelming French interest in the islands.22 2
The New Hebridean situation progressively began to rigidify, and in
1886, the French government proposed an entente commune, which led to
the Convention of 16 November 1887.223 This convention established a
Joint Naval Commission, staffed by British and French naval officers, who
were to maintain order and protect the lives and property of the British and
French in the New Hebrides. 224 In 1887, a very vague Anglo-French
condominium was established. 225 However, this regime cannot be
considered a condominium as we have defined it, for it was simply a
system ofjoint protection of national interests in a terranullius; no foreign
power was precluded from later taking possession of the New Hebrides.226
However, events had overtaken the machinery of the Joint Commission,
and an intensification of the Anglo-French presence could not be delayed.
In 1900, France began to introduce French law into the islands with
respect to French citizens, thus complementing the 1893 Pacific Order in
Council, which gave the British High Commissioner of the Western
Pacific's Court jurisdiction to decide cases affecting British citizens in
conformity with the substance of the law in force in England. 227 An Anglo218.
219.
220.
221.

See id. at 72.
See id.
See id. at 73.
Id.

222. See id.
223. See id. at 74-75.
224. See id. at 75 (citing Convention of 16 November 1887, art. 2).
225. Nicolas Politis, La condition internationaledesNouvelles Hebrides,8 R.G.D.I.P. 121-52,
230-71 (1901).
226. Politis recognized that "I'archipel ndo-hdbridais n'est soumis Aaucune souverainetd [the

archipelago of the New Hebrides is not subject to any sovereignty]"; therefore, the system set up
under the 1887 Convention could not be termed a condominium. Id at 260.
227. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 75. The 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act had already
stated:
It ... shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen to hold, exercise and enjoy any
jurisdiction which Her Majesty now has or may at any time hereafter have within
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French Declaration was made on April 8, 1904, anticipating the theory of
' which would underlie the Convention of 20
a "sphere ofjoint influence,"228

October 1906.229 The 1906 Convention stated that "the Group of the New
Hebrides, including the Banks and Torres Islands, [would] form a region
of 'joint influence' . . . and neither [Power would] exercise a separate
control over the Group."' 30 The principles ofthe condominium were stated
in the "General Instructions to the British and French High
Commissioners," of August 29,1907.231 The Instructions stated as follows:

mhe desire of the two Governments is to secure the exercise
of their paramount rights (droitsde souverainete)in the New
Hebrides. The two Powers, who were mutually bound not to
intervene separately in the New Hebrides, now agree to
intervene there together. Instead of remaining mutually
exclusive, their paramount rights are combined; the two
countries jointly assume jurisdiction (souverainete) in the
islands, and thereby provide against the possible appearance
of a third Power.232
One should not be too much confused by the terms employed, since both
powers recognized that "'[d]iplomatic history furnished no exact
precedent.' ,233 Indeed, a "joint jurisdiction" is obviously different from a
"joint influence," and both powers adopted the joint-sovereignty view.
Since the new regime immediately experienced difficulties, a protocol to
the 1906 Convention was adopted at a conference in London in 1914; the
Protocol, however, was not ratified until 1922.234 It essentially affected the
government and administration of the condominium, but not its basic
status.

a foreign country in the same and as ample a manner as if Her Majesty had
acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of territory.
53 & 54 Vict. c. 37 (Eng.).
228. EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 141-42. "The two Governments agree to draw up in concert
an agreement which, without involving any modification of the political status quo, shall put an end
to the difficulties arising from the absence of jurisdiction over the natives of the New Hebrides."
97 B.F.S.P. at 53.
229. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 75-76.
230. Id. at 92 (citing Convention of 1906, art. (1)).
231. See id. at 93.
232. Id. (citing 100 B.F.S.P. at 519).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 76.
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In 1954, another conference was convened in Honiara to examine
amendments to the 1914 Protocol. However, since Britain had little
interest in remaining in the New Hebrides and considering the growth of
the nationalist movement at the end of the 1960s, it soon became obvious
that the only way out was independence, which was achieved in 1979.

3. Succession Condominia
These condominia are usually established at the end of a war by a
treaty. The vanquished state cedes one or several territories to a coalition
or members of a coalition. As such, these condominia are examples of
state succession with regard to territories.23

a. The Schleswig-Holstein Duchies (Annex, Fig. 3)
The Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenbourg were the subject
of a dispute between Denmark and Germany for hundreds of years.236
According to the Treaty of Vienna of 30 October 1864, which ended the
war between Denmark, and Austria and Prussia, Denmark ceded the
Duchies to Austria and Prussia." Article 3 of the Treaty provided: "His
Majesty the King of Denmark renounces all His rights over the Duchies of
Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenbourg in favour of their Majesties the King
of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, engaging to recognise the
dispositions which their said Majesties shall make with reference to those
Duchies. ' '238 In 1865, Austria and Prussia agreed on the organization of the
condominium over the duchies. 239 By the Convention of Gastein of August
14, 1865, Lauenbourg was ceded to Prussia, and the exercise of the rights
over the two other duchies was divided between Austria and Prussia.2' A
few distinctions, however, need to be made with regard to Lauenbourg:
"[I1t does not involve the sale by Austria of alleged rights over a territory
that is not Austria's since the territory is condominial; it is the sale of
Austria's rights to participate in the partial international condominial

235. See CORET, supra note 2, at 189.
.236. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 129.
237. See id

238. Id. at 129-30 (quoting Peace Handbooks, No. 35, Great Britain Foreign Office, at 102-03
(1929)).
239. See id at 130.
240. See id
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community. ' As to the Schleswig and Holstein, the condominial regime
was not questioned but the exercise of the competences by the partial
international condominial community was radically changed.242 The
enjoyment of the competences belonged to the community, but the exercise
of these competences was allocated among the member states of the
243
community on a geographical basis, as a decentralised condominium.
Following the Austro-Prussian War, under Article 5 of the Treaty of
Prague, August 23, 1866, Austria gave Prussia all Austria's rights over
Schleswig-Holstein. 2'
b. Dantzig (January10 to November 15, 1920)

Dantzig, a city located at the mouth of the Vistula river, is one of the
territories detached by the Peace Treaties from the Central Powers after
World War I, ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and
held by them in condominium pending final allocation.2 41 Section XI of
46
Part II of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919 dealt with Dantzig.
Article 100 of the Treaty reads: "Germany renounces in favor of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and title over
[Dantzig]. ,,247

However, this condominium was only temporary, for

Articles 102 made it clear that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

241. "IIs'agit de la vente par l'Autriche non point de prttendus droits sur un territoire qui
n'est pas le sien par definition puisqu'il est condominial, mais de son droit de participation Ala
communautd internationale partielle condominante, en ce qui concerne une partie du territoire
condominial." CORET, supranote 2, at 190.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Gastein Convention provided that Kiel and Rendsbourg were to be ceded
to the German Confederation at a later stage. See id In the meantime, a special condominial
administration was set up. See id at 191.
242. See id. at 191. "[LIe r6gime condominial n'est pas mis en cause, [mais] les conditions
d'exercice des comp6tences par la communautd internationale partielle condominante sont
fondamentalement transformdes." Id
243. See i. "En effet, si lajouissance des comptences demeure attribu6e Ala communautd,
l'exercice de ces memes compdtences fait l'objet d'une r6partition g6ographique entre Etats
membres de la communautd; c'est ce que nous qualifions de 'condominium d6centralis6."' Id.
244. See EL-ERIAN, supranote 1, at 131.
245. See CORET, supranote 2, at 194. One could also cite, inter alia, the cases of Northern
Dobroudja from May 1918 (Treaty of Bucharest creating a condominium of Austria-Hungary,
Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey) to November 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly by which the territory was
ceded to Romania), see id. at 193, and of Memel from June 1919 (Article 99 of the Treaty of
Versailles creating a condominium of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan) to May 1924 (Treaty
of Paris by which the territory was ceded to Lithuania), see id. at 196-98. The question of the exGerman colonies and the theory of mandates has already been discussed.
246. CORET, supra note 2, at 194.
247. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 153, art. 100.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

47

Florida Journal of FLORIDA
International
Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 3
JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12

would undertake to establish the town of Dantzig, together with certain
neighboring territories, as a Free City to be placed under the protection of
the League of Nations.248 When the Treaty of Versailles came into force
on January 10, 1920, the Free City of Dantzig was created. 24 9 According
to Article 104 of the Treaty,
[t]he Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to
negotiate a Treaty between the Polish Government and the
Free City of Dantzig, which shall come into force at the same
time as the establishment of the said Free City, with the
following object:
(6) To provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the
conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Dantzig as
well as 25
the
0 diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when
abroad.
On November 9, 1920, the envisaged treaty was concluded at Paris
and came into force on November 15.251 Hence, one could consider that
the condominium over Dantzig lasted from January 10 to November 15,
1920, for it was on January 10, 1920 that the principal powers (France,
Great Britain, Italy, and Japan), appointed the president of the district to
administer the territory temporarily in their own names.252 In November

1920, a constitution was adopted, and in May 1922 it was formally
approved by the League of Nations, transforming this condominium into
a state having close relations with the League of Nations and Poland.253
c. Germany After 1945
On June 5, 1945, under the Declaration of Berlin, the United States,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
provisional government of the French Republic assumed "'supreme
authority with respect to Germany including all the powers possessed by
the German Government, the high command, and any state, municipal, or
local government or authority.' , 254 These governments further declared
248. See Malcolm M. Lewis, The Free City of Dantzig, 1924 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 90.
249. See CoRET, supra note 2, at 194.
250. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 153, art. 104.
251. See CORET, supra note 2, at 194.
252. See id
253. See Lewis, supra note 248, at 90-92.
254. Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status ofGermany According to the Declaration ofBerlin, 39
AM. J. INT'L L. 518, 518 (1945) (quoting Declaration of Berlin, 68 U.N.T.S. 189, 60 Stat. 1649
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that they would decide the boundaries and status of Germany or any area
considered part of German territory. 2" Hans Kelsen writes that this meant
"the German territory, together with the population residing on it, [had
been] placed under the sovereignty of the four powers."256 He argues that
since there was no longer a legitimate German government, "the
unconditional surrender signed by the representatives of the last legitimate
Government of Germany [could] be interpreted as a transfer of Germany's
sovereignty to the victorious powers signatories to the surrender treaty. '
This regime was qualified by Kelsen as a condominium, which he
defines as "two or more states exercis[ing] jointly their sovereignty over a
certain territory.""25 Though, as already explained, we do not share this
indeed, Kelsen does not explain who
definition of a condominium enjoys the sovereign rights over Germany, nor does he avoid the error of
speaking of "common organs of the participating states" 259- we share the
view that Germany, by this Declaration, became a condominial territory.
It has, however, been suggested that the Declaration put Germany
under a collective belligerent occupation. 2" This view is based on a twofold mistake. First, as explained by Kelsen, belligerent occupation was not
possible in Germany after its unconditional surrender, as Germany was in
26 and especially after the Government of Grand
a state of deballatio,
Admiral Doenitz had collapsed. Indeed, belligerent occupation requires a
state of war between the occupant and the occupied states.262 According to
Kelsen, Germany no longer existed as a sovereign state once its last
government had been abolished by the Allies.263 Secondly, the status of

(1945)).
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See id. at 521-22.
Id. at 518.
Id.at 518-19.
Id.at 523.
Id. at 524.

260. See DINH ET AL., supra note 107, § 323, at 470. Dinh and colleagues state that "[i]l
s'agissait d'une substitution totale, mais temporaire, de comptence; car iln'dtait pas question
d'annexer ce pays ni d'attribuer aux Allids, meme collectivement, la souverainett territoriale en
Allemagne. Les occupants se rdservaient seulement l'exercice des attributs de la souverainetd
" [It was a
territoriale, dans l'attente de I'apparition d'un nouveau gouvernement allemand ....
matter of a complete, though temporary, substitution ofjurisdiction; indeed, it was not envisaged
to annex this country or to attribute to the Allies, even collectively, territorial jurisdiction over
Germany. The occupying forces had only reserved the exercise of the attributes of territorial
jurisdiction, until a new German government would be created.] Id.
261. See Kelsen, supra note 254, at 520.
262. See id. at 518; Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 1907, arts. 42-56.

263. See Kelsen, supra note 254, at 519.
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occupation assumes that belligerent occupation does not confer upon the
occupant power sovereignty of the occupied state. However, those
advocating the occupation theory base their rejection of the condominium
solution on the ground that the condominial territory must be annexed to
those of the condomini. 2" But we have seen that this is flatly wrong
because the condominial territory is not a common territory of the
condomini, but a territory submitted to the competences of an international
condominial community. Actually, this principle is recognized by the
Declaration, which "'does not effect the annexation of Germany."' 265
However, this has been misinterpreted by Kelsen who sticks to the theory
of sovereignty to explain a condominium. According to Kelsen, the "nonannexation view" is untenable because "Germany certainly ha[d] ceased to
exist as a sovereign state and, since the territory [wa]s not under Germany's
own sovereignty, it would be no state's land if it were not under the
sovereignty of the occupant powers." 266
As a result, the only difference Kelsen sees between subjugation (read
conquest) of, and condominium over, Germany, is that the former implies
annexation (that is, permanent acquisition) while the latter means provisory
acquisition.2 61 This seems to be in complete contradiction with the theory
of condominium, for it is hard to see how the international condominial
community, which does not have an international personality, could
properly annex a territory. A more accurate conclusion would be that the
condominial community enjoyed and exercised state competences over the
German territory. International organs were set up for this purpose, since
the "supreme authority" was exercised by four commanders-in-chief
constituting the control council.2 68 As this exercise was divided into four
zones of occupation for administrative purposes, one could consider this
condominium as being decentralized. 69 As a consequence of the status of
Germany, the unilateral creation of two German states in 1949, first by the
three Western Powers, and then by the USSR, was made in violation of the
264. See 2OPPENHEIM'S INERNATIONAL LAW § 170, at 567 (Sir Robert Jennings& Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). "When on June 5, 1945, [the Allies]... assumed supreme authority over
[Germany], they provided an example ofjoint exercise of 'supreme governmental authority;' it was
not, however, properly a condominium because there was no annexation of the territory." Id If
so, what kind of a regime was this? Note that in the 1953 edition, there was no reference to
annexation, and it was written that the Allies provided an example of "joint exercise of
sovereignty." I OPPENHEIM, supra note 81, § 171, at 411.
265. Kelsen, supra note 254, at 520; see COREr, supranote 2, at 217.
266. Kelson, supra note 254, at 521; see CoRET, supra note 2, at 217-18.
267. See Kelsen, supranote 254, at 524.
268. Id. at 523.
269. See id at 524.
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Berlin Declaration and the Postdam Agreement.2 70 This violation of
condominial law can only be appreciated according to the general rules of
the creation of states in international law and the principle ex injuriajus
non oritur,which cannot be analyzed without losing touch with our present
27
topic. '

270. CORET, supra note 2, at 222-23.
271. One could not invoke the desuetude or tacit termination of the quadripartite agreements
because both the Western States and the USSR continued to talk about their "reserved rights [droits
rdservds] in Germany" tojustify their position towards West and East Germany. Id at 225. Taking
into account the existence of those states, the recognition of which had been secured in 1954 for
each of them, one could adopt the view stated by Coret that "[u]nder the formal plan the
condiminial status persists." Id However, as Coret continues:
Sur le plan mat riel ...[l]'6chec du fonctionnement du statut condominial a
donn6 naissance A deux situations effectives dont l'une est celle d'un statut de
coimperium [exercd par les Occidentaux sur la Rdpublique f6ddrale allemande] et
I'autre celle d'un rdgime d'imperium [exercd par I'URSS A I'dgard de la
Rdpublique ddmocratique allemande].
II en rdsulte que tout en conservant int6gralement son titre A lajouissance et
Al'exercice des compdtences Al'6chelon de l'ensemble de I'Allemagne, chacun
des Etats membres de la communautd n'exerce en fait que certaines responsabilitds
singuli6rement plus restreintes matdriellement que ces comptences, sur une partie
du territoire allemand, partie sur laquelle existe au surplus un Etat allemand.
[In reality... the failure of the condominial regime has given birth to two
effective situations, one of which being that of a co-imperium [exercised by the
Western States over the German Federal Republic], and the other one being that
of an imperium [exercised by the USSR over the German Democratic Republic].
As a result, while fully keeping its title to the enjoyment and exercise of the
competences over the whole of Germany, each of the member States of the
community only exercises certain responsibilities which, in fact, are far more
restricted than these competences, over a part of German territory on which, in
addition, on finds a German State.]
Id. at 226. Nonetheless, one can legitimately ask whether Coret identified all the consequences of
the creation of these two states by the condomini and recognized by other powers. This was a
situation flatly incompatible with the survival of the condominial regime, even if one
accommodated it with a putative co-imperial regime. Indeed the question remains as to the extent
to which the quadripartite agreements are still applicable to the two states according to the pacta
tertiisrule. See REUTER, supranote 126, § 168, at 101. Might it not be more convenient to talk
of zones of influence over the two German states?
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III. CONDOMINIA IN CONCRETO

A. TerritorialJurisdiction
It has been noted that theories that take the state as a starting point
cannot explain correctly the legal nature of a condominium.32 Indeed, we
have referred to the private law theory of territory as the "object" of the
state, 27'a theory we rejected in general. This theory is even more erroneous
when it comes to the territorial jurisdiction over a condominium.
Cavaglieri states that the right of a state over its territory is like a right in
rem (un droit de nature rdelle), a dominium, the nature and effects of
which are governed by public law.2 4 This right encompasses the whole
territory and has nothing to do with a right of ownership, which under
private law would be exercised by individuals over parts of the territory. 2
The former feudal law confusion between dominium eminens and private
property is contrary to the modem notion of the state. 2 6 The only feature
common to both rights is the absolute and exclusive power, with a jus
excludendi alios, exercised by a state, vis-A-vis the other states, and an
owner vis-A-vis the other owners.2 " Cavaglieri distinguishes coimperium
from condominium, explaining that coimperium "does not entirely suffice
to explain the legal power of each interested State over the joint territory
....This exceptional situation finds its legal justification if we consider
that the territory in question is the subject of a genuine right of
condominium and hence, belongs to them pro indivisio."2 78 This view is

272. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 59 (stating that "the notion of an association of
sovereignties over a single territory is incompatible with the idea of a territory subject to a

community of States").
273. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1,at 94-95; supra notes 46-74 and accompanying text.
274. See Cavaglieri, supra note 79, at 385. "[N]ous croyons que le droit de l'Etat sur son
territoire est un droit de nature r6elle, un dominium, dont ia nature et les effets appartiennent au
droit public." Id.
275. See id. "Ce droit embrasse tout le territoire dans sa composition unitaire et n'a par
cons&luent rien Avoir avec le droit de propridtd, qui serait exercd par des particuliers et dans la
sphre du droit privd sur des fractions de cc meme territoire." Id.
276. See id. "L'ancienne confusion du droit fModal entredominiumeminenset proprit priv6e
" Id.
est contraire A Ia notion moderne de l'Etat ....
277. See id."II n'y a qu'un seul point commun aux deux droits. C'est celui du pouvoir absolu
et exclusif sur le domaine, avec unjus excludendi alios que 'Etat fait valoir dnergiquement vis-i-

vis des autres Etats et le propridtaire vis-i-vis des autres propridtaires." Id
278. "ne suffit pas &expliquer enti~rement le pouvoirjuridique de chacun des Etats intdressds
sur le territoire commun ....Cette situation exccptionnelle trouve sa justification juridique dans
la considdration que le territoire en question est l'objet d'un vdritable droit de condominium et leur
appartient, par cons6quent, pro indivisio." Id. at 3 88-89.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/3

52

CONDOMINMA
Bantz: the International
Legal Status of Condominia

obviously wrong, for how could each condomini have a legal power over
a condominium and at the same time hold it in an undivided form with the
other condomnini? This could only be tenable were the condominium a
copropritd,which it certainly is not since each condomini does not enjoy
a right in rem over a portion of the condominial territory.
Nor is the doctrine of the territory being the state itself capable of
explaining territorial jurisdiction over a condominium, since this theory
(notably advocated by Jellineck or Carrd de Malberg) finds itself in dire
straits when in comes to the relations between the legal personality of the
state and its continuity in cases of cession and adjunction of territory.
Since a condominial territory is never annexed to its condomini, either the
territory is not always assimilated into the state, or the condomini lose their
statehood in the condominium. But this is in complete contradiction with
the territory-subject theory, which leaves the condominium as a regime sui
generis. A third theory sees in the territory the limit of sovereignty. But
once again, this would call for tools identifying how each condomini could
consider the condominial territory as "being the subject of a right of the
State and the space wherein it exercises its sovereignty and its
jurisdiction. ' 7 9
As previously stated, only the theory of competences held by the
condominial community is able to describe what kind of territorial
jurisdiction is exercised over the condominial territory. Territorial
jurisdiction, compitence territoriale,has been defined by Rousseau in a
two-fold way.28 0 First, it implies a legal power, and consequently, must be
understood as a body of legal powers recognised as belonging to the
state.28 ' Secondly, it is characterized by "its exclusive nature, which
basically implies a monopoly of the state in three areas: coercion
[contrainte],justice [le jouvoirjuridictionnel], and the organisation of
public services."2 2 This territorial jurisdiction is enjoyed by the

279. "l'objet d'un droit de I'Etat et l'espace &l'intdrieur duquel s'exercent sa souverainetd et
sajuridiction." Lauterpacht, supranote 48, at 321; see Bourquin, supranote 93, at 114-15 (stating
that in fact, the state is nothing more than a "normative order" [ordre normatiJ, and the territory
is nothing more than the portion of the space wherein the validity of this order is, in principle,
circumscribed).
280. See CORET, supra note 2, at 43.
281. See id It implies "un pouvoir juridique et il faut par consdquent entendre par
souverainetd territoriale un ensemble de pouvoirsjuridiques reconnus Aun Etat pour lui permettre
d'accomplir, dans un espace ddtermind, les fonctions dtatiques" Id.
282. "son exclusivisme qui implique essentiellement un monopole en trois domaines:
monopole de la contrainte, de l'exercice du pouvoirjuridictionnel, de l'organisation des services
publics." Id.; see Island ofPalmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 831 (U.N. Trib. Arb. 1928).
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condominial community, not only to the exclusion of third states,2 s3 but
also to the exclusion of the condomini. The latter consequence has often
led to misunderstandings. Indeed, in their "Instructions to the High
Commissioners of the New Hebrides," dated August 29, 1907, the British
and the French governments stated that "'the two nations, who formerly
exercised only a personal jurisdiction over their own nationals, assume a
quasi-territorial jurisdiction. For the British resident, that jurisdiction will
be British, for the French it will be French."2 The French version reads:
"'The national law, which governed them [the citizens] until the present
in a personal capacity, governs them from now on in a territorial capacity;
for the French, the archipelago is French territory, and for the English,
English Territory.'"'2 5 These texts obviously do not coincide." The
British text evades the idea that the territory is British territory for British
subjects, and refers to "jurisdiction."2
The system contrived in the New Hebrides is described in the
English text as "quasi-territorial," with the implication that the
jurisdiction of the two Powers is not in all respects plenary;
and the conclusion is that the Group is part neither of the
British nor the French national domain .... But in the French
text the jurisdiction is "a titre territorial;"this means that the
territory is, for French citizens, and for aliens who opt for the
French system, French territory .... 288
The French view is unacceptable because it completely emasculates
the fact that the condominial territory is not ajoint territory that each of the
condominii is entitled to consider its own. If such were the case, each
could accomplish sovereign acts on the territory. This view does not
differentiate between territorial jurisdiction and the territorial aspect of a
competence that is granted by condominial law to the condomini. The
British view is by far the more accurate, for the New Hebrides has never
been considered a British territory,2' 9 while the French position is less clear.
The New Hebrides clearly did not qualify as a dipartementd'outre-mer

283. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
284. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 94 (quoting 100 B.F.S.P. 520).
285. "'[L]a loi nationale, qui les [the citizens] rdgissaitjusqu'A prdsentb&titre personnel, les
rdgit dordnavant Atitre territorial; pour les Franais, l'archipel est territoire Franqais, pour les
Anglais, territoire Anglais.'" Id.
286. See id
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See id at 109.
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[overseas department], a territoire d'outre-mer [overseas territory], or an
Etat associi [associated state] within the meaning of the French
The Comitijuridiquede l'Union
Constitution of the Fourth Republic.'
franeaise considered in 1948 that the New Hebrides could qualify as a
They reasoned that the
territoire associi [associated territory]. 9
uncertainty regarding the category of associated territories would enable
one to hold that the New Hebrides belonged to the French Commonwealth
since the archipelago was subject to a regime of condominium but in
proportion to the French influence there. 2" This obviously confuses
territorial jurisdiction and the territorial aspect of the personal jurisdiction,
which in the case of the New Hebrides is enjoyed and exercisedby France
293
over French nationals (and by Great Britain over British nationals).

290. See id at 85.
291. See id (citing Comitijuridiquede i'Unionfran~aise,2 REV. JUR. DEL'UNIONFRANi AISE

241 (1948)).
292. See id

"Cette incertitude concernant la catdgorie des territoires associds permettrait de
soutenir que les Nouvelles Hdbrides rentrent i ce titre dans l'Union franaise, non
pas d'une faron totale puisque i'archipel est soumis i un regime de condominium,
mais parte in qua, c'est-i-dire dans la mesure de l'influence qu'y exerce la
Frane...
Id (quoting Comitijuridiquede l'Unionfranfaise,supranote 291, at 241). The Comitijuridique

concluded that, according to Articles 62 and 65 of the Constitution, the New Hebrides could not
be part of the Unionfrangaise,but only because the French influence was exercisedparte in qua
and not on the whole territory. See id This "divisibility" is not in conformity with the status of a
condominium. See id at 85 n.1.
293. Note that the legal status of the New Hebrides was raised before the French National
Court in the New Hebrides in Nguyen Ngoc Thoa of 1960 (unreported). See id at 86. In his
decision, the Frenchjudge doubted whether the condominium could be viewed as ajuridical person
under French law. See id. The matter was referred to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
responded that "the condominium was not apersonnalitJmorale[de]droit administratifbutit was

an international legal person and hence, was competent to appear in court." Id It was found that
the condominium existed in international law as a subject of law, with the ability to exercise the
rights that the signatory powers had given it. See id at 87. The situation was considered analogous
to Morocco's position under French protection. See id. This is flatly wrong if we consider the
international status of a condominium since in foreign courts, the condominium would obviously
shelter under the immunity of the condomini. However, the condomini rightly enquired whether
the condominium itself could be sued in the Joint Court. See id. This is a question of domestic
legal personality and has nothing to do with a putative recognition of international personality.
As a matter of equity, it can be argued that the Protocol should be interpreted so as permitting
action againstjoint services just as British and French nationals are permitted to take action against
their own governments. In fact, "les gouvernements frangais et britannique ont engagd des
discussions en vue de modifier le Protocole de 1914 et d'y inclure la reconnaissance de la
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If condomini are allowed to exercise territorial jurisdiction on the
condominial territory, this can only be according to condominial law. As
previously noted the community can act through mediate or immediate
organs. 29" "The immediate international organ is that designated by the

treaty which creates the Condominium, and which exercises the
competence of [the community]., 295 In the New Hebrides, this would be
the native courts or the Joint Court. "The mediate international organs are
those which, consequent upon the duplication of services [didoublement
fonctionnel], exercise their competence in the Condominial territory,
although they properly belong to each of the [Condomini]." 29 This
duplication of services is often needed when a condominium lacks its own
organs if the degree of institutionalization is weak. This was the case in
Moresnet where "an agreement was reached in 1853 whereby both
commissioners were to supervise together the general administration of the
police, and whereby they were entitled, in each particular case, to act
separately and notably to ask for the help of the Gendarmerie of their own
respective States. "29

This case is even stronger in decentralized

condominia, where territorial competences are exercised by the condomini
qua states on a geographical basis. This is clear in the Gastein Convention,
already cited, which states as follows:
The exercise of the Rights acquired in common by the High
Contracting Parties, in virtue of Article 3 of the Vienna Treaty
of Peace of 30th October, 1864 shall, without prejudice to the
continuance of those rights of both Powers to the whole of
both Duchies, pass to H.M. the Emperor of Austria as regards

personnalitd juridique du condominium. .

.

.

[Mais] la personnalitd reconnue A I'autoritt

administrative conjointe ne ddploiera en principe ses effets que dans I'ordre interne condominial."
[the French and the British Governors have entered into talks with a view to modifying the 1914
Protocol, and to including therein the acknowledgement of the legal personality of the
condominium.... [But] the effects of the personality of the joint administrative authority would
in principle only be felt at the internal level of the condominial legal order.] BENOIST, supranote
99, at 105-06, 108.
294. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 83.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. "[E]n 1853, intervint un accord chargeant les deux Commissaires d'exercer de concert
l'administration gdndrale de la police et les autorisant i agir, dans chaque cas particulier,
s~pardment et notamment &requ6rir la gendarmerie de leur pays respectifs." Nicolas Politis,
Condition internationale du territoirede Moresnet-La question des jeux, 11 R.G.D.I.P. 68, 77
(1904) (emphasis added). The same method was applied to the judicial system. See infra Part
111(C).
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the Duchy of Holstein, and to H.M. the King of Prussia as
regards the Duchy of Schleswig."
The situation was slightly different for Germany, as the 1945
Declaration of Berlin2 " delineates that the supreme authority will be
exercised in Germany by the French, the American, the British, and the
Soviet commanders-in-chief in their respective zones of occupation, and
jointly for questions concerning Germany as a whole. 3° One is thus led to
the conclusion that only those competences of a zonal interest are exercised
by states in their own geographical areas, while questions ofpivotal interest
continue to be dealt with by the condominial community as such over the
whole of Germany. However, it must be emphasized that in the case of a
decentralized condominium, the condomini are only entitled by
condominial law to exercise territorial competences.
Territorial
jurisdiction, which implies the enjoyment of those competences and
ultimately the right to dispose of the territory, remains vested in the
condominial community.
B. PersonalJurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is the legal relationship between a state and its
nationals. It can be exercised by states over their nationals wherever they
are located, that is, in the absence of any territorial link with their national
state. Consequently, personal jurisdiction can conflict with the territorial
jurisdiction of the state where nationals are located and then usually only
concerns the nationals' personal status. Personal jurisdiction is sometimes
said to apply over foreigners located on national soil, but in such a case,
personal jurisdiction is merely a form of territorial jurisdiction. Since the
condominial community is exercising state competences over a territory,
it also is vested with personal jurisdiction. The latter affects three
categories of persons: the natives, the nationals of the condomini, and the
nationals of third states.
Natives can be defined as those persons who are neither the nationals
of the condomini nor of any other state and who were born on the
condominial territory or were established there at the date of the creation
of the condominium. The relationship of the natives to the condominial
community is very difficult to characterize. The term "nationality" must
298. Gastien Convention, art. 1, PEACE HANDBOOK No. 35 GREAT BRITAIN FOREIGN OFFICE
103-05 (1920).
299. Declaration of Berlin, Regarding Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme
Authority by the Allied Powers, 68 U.N.T.S. 189, 60 Stat. 1649 (1945).

300. See Kelsen, supra note 254, at 523.
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be rejected from the outset because it has constantly been reserved to
identify the link between a state and an individual, a juristic person, or a
ship.3 ' Nor is it possible to have recourse to relations such as the
functional link that exists between an international organization and its
agents, for this concept only applies to organizations enjoying international
personality. 0 2 In addition, it is not possible to classify the natives as
stateless persons for, when abroad, they are not subject to the mere
territorial jurisdiction of the state they are located in, but are entitled to
protection by the condomini. And when on the territory of one of the
condomini, they are not considered foreigners even though they cannot be
assimilated with nationals without violating condominial law. This is well
explained by Nicolas Politis with respect to Moresnet, the natives of which
were often called "undivided subjects. 3 °3
As long as they stay in Moresnet, they certainly cannot be
considered Belgians or Prussians .... But what is their

situation outside the joint territory? Should they be
considered foreigners in Belgium and in Prussia, and stateless
on the territory of a third State?... However, it seems that if
they cannot be assimilated to nationals in Belgium and in
Prussia, they cannot be considered foreigners either;
consequently, they cannot be deported therefrom.
Furthermore, it seems logical to admit that on the territory of
a third State. they cannot be treated as stateless persons
(Heimatlosen), for it would seem strange if they could not
claim any of the two sovereignties to which they are subject;
practically, they should be under the joint protection of the
Belgian and the Prussian consuls.3°

301. See Nottebohm (SecondPhase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
302. See ReparationforInjuriesSuffered in the Service ofthe UnitedNations, 1949 I.C.J. 174,
182 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11).
303. Nicolas Politis, Chronique des Faits Internationaux:Belgique et Prusse - Condition
internationale du territoire de Moresnet - La question des jeux, I1 1G.D.I.P..68, 80 (1904).
304.
Tant qu'ils restent A Moresnet meme, ilest certain qu'ils ne peuvent etre

considdrds ni comme Belges ni comme Pmssiens .... Mais quelle est leur
condition en dehors du territoire commun? Doivent-ils, en Belgique et en Prusse,
etre consid6rds comme des 6trangers et, sur le territoire d'un Etat tiers, comme des
personnes sans nationalit?... On semble cependant disposd Aadmettre que si,

ne peuvent pas
en Belgique et en Prusse, ils

ne
etre assimil6s aux nationaux, ils

peuvent pas non plus y etre consid&r6s comme des &tangers; on en conclut qu'ils
ne sauraient y faire l'objet d'un arretd d'expulsion. I!semble logique d'admettre
ne peuvent pas etre traitds comme
en outre que, sur le territoire d'un Etat tiers, ils
ne
des heimatlosen, car ilserait bizarre que, relevant de deux souverainet6s, ils
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The link between the natives and the condominial community is not
easy to qualify. It cannot be compared to that applying to natives of a
mandate, a trusteeship, a nonself-governing territory, a protectorate, or a
territory under international administration. In the first three, there exists
a link of a personal nature between the natives and the administering state,
a link which is under control of the League of Nations in the case of a
mandate, and the United Nations in the case of a trusteeship and a nonselfgoverning territory. In the case of protectorate, natives keep their former
nationality. In a territory under international administration, there exists a
juridical link between natives and the United Nations, as in the case of
Namibia.3"5 The situation is different in the case of a condominium, since
"the partial international condominial community enjoys towards the
natives of the condominial territory competences identical to that of a State
towards its nationals."3 "° The exercise of that personal jurisdiction by
international organs is not problematic on condominial territory. However,
as a consequence of the absence of international personality of the
condominial community, there is no way this could be exercised abroad.
As a result, it is only by virtue of a special personal link between natives
and the condomini that the former can claim a personal status that
materializes the exercise of the personal jurisdiction by the condomini.
This link still needs to be exemplified. The 1914 Protocol on the
New Hebrides states in Article VIII(3) that "the High Commissioners and
Resident Commissioners shall have authority over the native chiefs, [and]
they shall have power to make administrative and police regulations
binding on the tribes, and to provide for their enforcement.,3 0 7 A
condominial criminal code also was created. But although the natives
owed allegiance to the condominial community, they were deprived of the
nationality of either condomini since Article VIII(2) prohibits the natives
from acquiring in the Group the status of subject or citizen of either
government, or from being under the separate protection of either power.30

pussent se r6clamer d'aucune d'elles; pratiquement, ils devraient etre sous la
protection collective des consuls de Prusse et de Belgique.
Id.
305. On the controverted case of Trieste, see Andrd Gervais, Le statut du territoire libre de
Trieste, 51 R.G.D.I.P. 134-54 (1947).
306. "Iacommunaut6 internationale partielle condominante jouith d'gard des autochtones du
territoire condominial de comp6tences identiques i celles d'un Etat &l'dgard de ses nationaux."
CORET, supra note 2, at 253-54.

307. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 96.
308. See id. at 133-34. Thus, the Article seems to allow natives to acquire the nationality of
one of the condomini on its own territory. See 1914 Protocol Concerning Condominium in the
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For practical reasons, this was not always taken as gospel, and one can
envision the exercise of diplomatic protection as being divided between the
condomini on a geographical basis.3" The question was less theoretical in
the Sudan, since Article 114 of the Treaty of S~vres states that natives from
the Sudan shall be entitled to British diplomatic and consular protection
abroad (hence a recognition by third states of that special personal link is
granted). When a condominium over Sudan was genuinely established in
1936, Egypt was also permitted to exercise such protection.31 ° Jurisdiction
over natives was regulated by a 1900 Criminal Code applicable to any
person residing in the Sudan, while civil matters were, for the natives,
regulated exclusively by the Shari'a, Islamic religious law. A final remark
needs to be made with regard to "succession" condominia: "natives" in
that case are those nationals of the state, the whole or part of the territory
of which was subject to a condominium. One must necessarily come to the
conclusion that these people lose their former nationality and become
linked to the condominial community with the special personal jurisdiction
described above.31'

New Hebrides, London, B.T.S. 1922, No. 7, cmd. 1681 B.F.S.P. vol. 14 at 212.
309. Forjurisdiction purposes, it could be envisioned that the status of protected persons might
have been extended to natives of the New Hebrides. This was the case in Great Britain where the
British Protectorates, Protected States, and Protected Persons Orders in Council of 1949 and 1958
state in Section 6 that the provisions of the Act shall apply to the New Hebrides and to Canton
Island as if they were protected states. This status, though very convenient for practical purposes
not only depends on its recognition by condominial law, but also by third states when natives are
not located on Condomini's territories. The question, however, was never examined in legal
theory.
310. Sudan natives were considered British protected persons on British territory as well as
abroad, whereas they were assimilated as Egyptian nationals in Egypt, a position that violates
condominial law.
311. Coret aptly notes that
ce qui subsiste, du fait de l'inertie volontaire de la communautd condominante, ce
sont les r~gles qui, antdrieurement i la creation du condominium, rdgissaient
I'acquisition et la perte de la nationalitd de l'Etat dont le territoire a dtd ddtachd;
mais la persistance de ces rfgles n'empdche en aucune mani6re qu'elles ne sont
plus utilisdes d6sormais pour acqudrir ou perdre la nationalitd de cet Etat, mais
pour acqudrir ou perdre le lien d'alldgeance politico-juridique vis-A-vis de la
communautd condominante. [as a consequence of the voluntary inactivity of the
condominial community, there subsist the rules which, before the creation of the
condominium, governed the acquisition and loss of the nationality of the State the
territory ofwhich has been separated; however, these rules are henceforth not used
to acquire or lose the nationality of that State, but to acquire or lose the legal and
political link of allegiance towards the condominial community.]
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It is a feature common to all condominia that nationals of the
condomini are placed under the personal jurisdiction of their respective
state. In fact, it is usually not only personal status that is governed by
national law, but also the whole status in civil and criminal matters, as well
as in administrative matters."' This jurisdiction is characterized by an
equality of treatment of the nationals of the condomini on condominial
territory. Article I-I of the 1906 Treaty on the New Hebrides provides that
"the subjects of the two Powers would enjoy equal rights of residence,
personal protection and trade, and each of the two Powers will retain
jurisdiction over its own subjects."3 3 The Protocol of 1914 changed
"'retaining jurisdictionover its subjects"'"to" 'retaining sovereignty over
its nationals and over corporations legally constituted according to its
law.' "34 Article 20 of the 1914 Protocol drew the consequence of that
principle by creating separate national jurisdictions." 5 This principle was
also that applied on the Island of the Conference, for the Convention of 27
March 1901 not only sets the principle of the personal jurisdiction of each
of the condomini over its respective nationals, but also indicates in Article
2 that "'the French and the Spaniards are under the jurisdiction of their
respective tribunals, as regards the offences they commit on the Island of
Faisans.' ,"6 On the contrary, it was the practice in Moresnet that Belgian
and Prussian tribunals could indifferently be seized by a national of the
condomini, while the national continued to be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of his or her national state.3" 7 In Germany, the personal
jurisdiction of each of the Allies was maintained, as were civil and criminal
jurisdictions,
though some economic crimes were punished by condominial
318
organs.
CORET, supra note 2, at 268. In Germany, ex-Germans were submitted to a public law status
defined by the Control Council for the whole of Germany and by the zonal authorities of the zone
where they lived. If abroad, they were considered under the diplomatic protection of the
condomini, to the extent that this had been recognised by third states.
312. See Jabin-Dudognon, Conseil d'Etat (1938), D.P. III, 1939, at 56.
313. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 92. Article 11(5) of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1936
states that "there shall be no discrimination in the Sudan among British subjects and Egyptian
nationals with regard to commerce, immigration or acquisition of property." Id.
314. Id. Hence, French and British juristic persons were assimilated as French or British
individuals forjurisdictional purposes. However, in order to avoid conflicts over the determination

of such nationality, it was decided in Article I of the Protocol that the criterion would be that of
incorporation and not that of sihge reel as in French law.
315. See infra Part III(C).

316. "les Frangais et les Espagnols pour les infractions commises par eux dans l'ile des
Faisans, sontjusticiables de leurs tribunaux respectifs." CORET, supranote 2, at 266.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 269-70.
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However, one cannot so easily claim, as Coret does, that personal
jurisdiction is exercised over nationals "exactly in the same conditions as
' For each condomini,
if these nationals had stayed on national territory."319
personal jurisdiction derives from a title that is granted by condominial law
and not by general international law, as is the case for classical personal
jurisdiction. Since condominial territory is not national territory, personal
jurisdiction on condominial territory derives from a special domestic act.
The New Hebrides provides the clearest example. The French jurisdiction
derives from a loi [law] of July 30, 1900, whereby French citizens in
certain Pacific islands are protected by Presidential decrees,320 and by an
Arritj [order] of September 9, 1909, which provides that the publication
of French lois [laws], d~crets [decrees], and arr tis [orders] in the Journal
Officiel de la Nouvelle Cal~donie would make them applicable to French
nationals in the New Hebrides. 32 ' A further Dicretof 1912 provided that
the law applicable in New Caledonia would be applicable to French
nationals in the New Hebrides.322 As a result, some French laws applicable
on French metropolitan territory did apply to the New Hebrides.32 3 Since
the 1906 and 1914 Conventions were implemented in domestic law, they
had the same rank as laws pursuant to Article 26 of the 1946 Constitution,
and a rank superior to laws according to Article 55 of the 1958
Constitutio3 2 4 The possible conflicts between condominial law and
French law as applicable in the New Hebrides were solved according to
principles well known to French public lawyers.325
The English jurisdiction derives from the Order in Council of 2
November 1907, which incorporated the Pacific Order, 1893, in its
application to the New Hebrides.326
The latter gave the High
Commissioner of the Western Pacific's Court jurisdiction to decide cases
affecting British citizens in conformity with the substance of the law in
England. "The Protocol of 1914 was brought into internal operation in
English law by the New Hebrides Order in Council of 1922 which...

319. "exactement dans les memes conditions que si ces nationaux dtaient demeurds sur le
territoire national." Id. at 256.
320. See O'Connell, supranote2, at 118.
321. See id. at 119.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 119-20.
325. See id. at 120. In Guichard, CA Noumea, (Apr.-May 1961), Recucil Penant, 1961, No.
686, it "was considered that the French Labour Code was applicable in the New Hebrides since it
was not in conflict with any Joint Regulation and was not inconsistent with the Protocol."
O'Connell, supra note 2, at 120-21.
326. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 108.
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provided that the Protocol would 'have the force of law' and 'be binding
upon all persons' within the New Hebrides 'over whom His Majesty shall
at any time have jurisdiction.' 3, 27 For that purpose, the New Hebrides is
assimilated to a foreign territory under Her Majesty's jurisdiction and has
the same constitutional status as the British Solomon Islands Protectorate,
that is, it is protected territory.328 The 1961 Western Pacific (Courts) Order
in Council changed the position of the New Hebrides in English domestic
law.329 Under the Order, the "statutes of general application in force in
England on 1st day of January, 1961 [and] the substance of the English
common law and doctrines of equity" are applicable to the New
Hebrides.3 °
In view of the fact that condomini, whether in the New Hebrides, on
the Island of the Conference, or in Moresnet, keep their jurisdiction over
their nationals, one is tempted to conclude that it is not only the exercise
of that jurisdiction that is delegated to the condomini, but also the
enjoyment of that jurisdiction, whether or not one considers that it was
originally vested in the community. In fact, it is sensible to conclude that
it would be quite logical if the condominial community, as a result of its

territorial jurisdiction, exercised some personal jurisdiction over the
nationals within the limits of condominial territory. However, due to the
lack of a distinct legal personality of the community and its loose

institutionalization,
each state maintains personal jurisdiction towards its
33
nationals. '

327. Id
328. See id at 109.
329. Seeid at 110.
330. Id This of course would not prejudice the application to British subjects and optants of
Joint Regulations.
331. See CORET, supra note 2, at 255.
La logique voudrait que [la communautd condominante], en raison de sa
compdtences territoriale, exerce une certaine comp6tence personnelle Al'dgard de
ces nationaux dans les limites du terrioire condominial. Mas... I'absence de
personnalitdjuridique distincte de la communautd et la faible institutionnalisation
de cette derni~re, va entrainer le maintien de la comp6tence personnelle de chacun
des Etats en cause A l'dgard de ses nationaux.
Id. This indeed had a special application in the New Hebrides, for the national public services were
not functioning there according to the duplication of services theory, since they were not mediate
organs of the community. Rather, they involved not a dual exercise of condominial functions but
an exclusive exercise of the functions of organs peculiar to France and Great Britain. It could be

argued that the two powers were conceded this competence by the condominial community in
whom it was originally vested. However, Coret answers that international competence is always
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Nationals of third states are under the personal aspect of the territorial
jurisdiction of the condominial community, save for the personal status of
those foreigners who according to private international law are regulated
by their national state.332 Under Article 3 of the 1901 Convention on the
Island of the Conference, the tribunal competent to hear cases involving
foreigners is that of the state exercising the droit de police au moment de
Vinfraction [the right to enforce police rules at the moment the offence
occurs],33 according to the system studied below. If, however, the offence
or the tort also involves a French or a Spaniard, the French or Spanish
tribunals respectively will be competent. 334 All persons living in the Sudan
were subject to the criminal code of 1900 already alluded to.
The most original system was that in the New Hebrides. Article 1(3)
of the 1906 Convention states that "'the subjects and citizens of other
Powers shall, within the New Hebrides, remain subject to the fullest extent
to the laws of their respecting countries.' 335 However, Article VII of the
1914 Protocol, as amended in 1959, states that "[tihe High Commissioners
shall have power to issue jointly, for the maintenance of order and the good
government of the Group, and for carrying the present Convention into
effect, local regulations, binding on all the inhabitants of the Group without
exception. 336 For condominial jurisdiction purposes, Article II of the
Protocol created a system of "national assimilation," since nationals of
third powers, on arrival in the New Hebrides, had to decide within one
month for the British or the French legal systems, either verbally or by
written letter to the appropriate Resident Commissioner. 33 This was
compulsory, and individuals who did not choose a system were placed
under one by a joint decision of the High (Resident) Commissioners.338
a matter of international law, and national competence a matter of constitutional law; and in the
New Hebrides the national services did not exercise an international jurisdiction. See id.
332. See id. at 266.
333. See id
334. See id.
335. O'Connell, supranote 2, at 93 (quoting Convention Concerning the New Hebrides, art.
1(3), London, cmd. 3160, 90 B.F.S.P. 229 [hereinafter 1906 Convention]).
336. Id at 97 (quoting United Kingdom Treaty Series No. 18, cmd. 668 (1959)).
337. See id at 95.
338. See id. Once the choice was made, it was final. See id "The intention [was] to treat a
Swede, should he opt for the French system, as he would be treated in the law of New Caledonia,
and should he opt for the British system, as he would be treated in a British Protectorate." Id.
Individuals linked to one of the condomini by a special legal relation, such as protected persons or
citizens of the Union frangaise, were automatically registered with the relevant Commissioner.
Foreign juristic persons were treated according to the same system of assimilation for jurisdictional
purposes. Companies created in the Group had to be incorporated according to either French or
British law. Also note that the Protocol prohibited the registration of vessels in the New Hebrides
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C. Government andAdministration
According to the famous classification of Rousseau, "the state is a
grouping of public services, and has jurisdiction over three competences:
the organization, functioning and defense of its public services.""a 9
Competence to govern and to organize those public services belongs to the
condominial community on condominial territory. This is not the case on
the international level, such as regarding the defense of public services.
Since the administration of a condominium involves fewer theoretical
problems than territorial and personal jurisdictions, we shall mention only
a few examples and study in more depth the case of the New Hebrides.
The administrative structure of condominia is headed by condominial
governments and is ultimately composed of the governments of the
condomini. A department of those governments is usually in charge of
condominial affairs, for example, the French and Spanish Foreign
Ministers for the Island of the Conference, the French Overseas Minister
and the Colonial Office for the New Hebrides (but the British Foreign
Office for the Sudan), and the Kings of Belgium and Prussia for Moresnet.
All central governments are represented on condominial territory by
delegates or representatives, and these form the effective condominial
organ in charge of the condominium's administration. According to Article
2 of the 1939 Convention on Canton and Enderbury Islands, the United
States and Great Britain were represented by "a United States and a British
In Moresnet, the
official appointed by their respective Governments."'
condomini were represented by Delegate-Commissioners. In the New
Hebrides, Article II of the 1906 Convention provides that each signatory
power be represented in the Group by a High Commissioner, assisted by a
Resident Commissioner to whom the High Commissioner shall delegate
his authority, and who will represent him in the Group during his absence.
Regarding Germany, the Declaration of Berlin stated: "The supreme
authority . .. will be exercised 'jointly,' 'on instructions from their
governments,' by the Soviet, British, United States, and French
commanders in chief .... 'The four commanders in chief will together
constitute the control council. Each commander in chief will be assisted

other than those that were intended to sail under either the British or the French flag (Article 28).
This excluded the natives from seeking the protection of those flags.
poss&de A ce titre trois chefs
339. "[L'Etat est] un groupement de services publics [etl
particuliers de comlence:... l'organisation, ... le fonctionnement [et]... la defense de ses
services publics." RoussEAU, supranote 97, at 96-97.
340. Reeves, supra note 202, at 522.
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by a political adviser."' 34
In the Sudan, however, the supreme
condominial organ was composed of one person only. The 1899
Convention stated: "The Supreme military and civil command in the

Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the 'Governor-General of the
Sudan,' [who] shall be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the
recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.... .342 This
was unchanged by the 1939 Convention. In Dantzig, the condominial

organ was also simple: Sir Tower was appointed High Commissioner.
Public services and administrative organization vary according to the
importance of the condominium and the number of its inhabitants. For the
Island of the Conference, which has no natives or permanent inhabitants,
the 1901 Convention merely stated that the right to enforce police rules
would be exercised by France and Spain for alternate six-month periods,
the order to be decided by draw.343 In Germany, there were permanent
coordinating committees composed of one representative from each of the
four commanders in chief and a control staff organized in several divisions,

such as, military, naval, air, transport, political, economic, finance, internal
affairs, and legal affairs.3" Directive No. 10 of September 22, 1945
indicates the acts that the control council was authorized to issue:
"proclamations" for acts of pivotal importance, "laws" for general matters,
"orders," "directives," and "instructions" of a general or particular
interest.3 45 As a succession condominium, it is worth noting that the former
administrative structures, for example, the Gemeinde [municipalities], the
Regierungsprasidenten[Chief Admininstrators], and the Landrate [the

administrative heads] were maintained,' except for those that were
politically oriented, such as the Gau.347 This characteristic also was present
in Moresnet, which even though it was a frontier condominium also was
a case of state succession to the French Empire. As a result, Moresnet did
not have an electoral system but was under the administrative regime
enacted in France by the law of 28pluvi6se an VII" The administration
of Moresnet consisted of a mayor, two deputy mayors, and a ten-member

341. Kelsen, supra note 254, at 532 (quoting Declaration of Britain, 68 U.N.T.S. 189,60 Stat.
1649).
342. EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 164 (quoting 1899 Convention art. 3, B.F.S.P. at 638). In
practice,
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

the Governor has always been British.
See CORET, supra note 2, at 265.
See id at 289.
Id at 289-90.
See id. at 294.
See id Tribal districts and a former Nazi Administrative District.
See Politis, supra note 303, at 78.
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town council."49 The Belgian and Prussian Commissioners acted as
prefects, having the same powers that under the law of an VIII were given
to prefects in towns with under 5000 inhabitants.350

In the New Hebrides, it was the Resident Commissioners who were
the effective administrators, though they were answerable to the High
Commissioners.35' Condominium matters were placed under joint
services. 352 They were dealt with by a separate condominium
administrative structure, which was not connected with either the French
or the British administration, save for the case of the District Agents and
others who were seconded from their national heirarchy. 353 The Resident
3
Commissioners appointed and commanded the condominium officers. 1
Those joint services included posts and telegraphs, public works, ports,
buoys and lights, public health, the Joint Court, the Courts of First Instance
and Native Courts, joint native prisons, finance, the Land Registry, the
service of the administrative districts, the department of survey, the Official
Gazette, the police force when the two corps were acting jointly, and all
other services that the High Commissioners or Resident Commissioners
decided to add.355
A major obstacle to the efficiency of the condominium service was
the requirement that French and the British appointments to vacant posts
be equal.356 The head of a department'had to be of a different nationality
than his deputy. 3" For example, the Treasurer was always British and his
Adjoint au chef always French. 38 Under Article 11-3 of the Protocol, the
Resident Commissioners, by a joint decision, established administrative
districts, with each district having both a British and a French district
head. 3 9 These agents had authority over their respective dependants and

349. See id.

350. See id The civil and criminal jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with the choice
of the plaintiff, either in the Belgian Tribunal of Verviers, or the Prussian Tribunal at Aix-laChapelle; they, however, had to apply French law as it stood before 1816. See id. at 77-80. There
was no administrative jurisdiction, for the laws of August 16-24, 1790 and 16fructidor an lllonly
regulated the jurisdiction for civil and criminal matters. See id. at 78.
351. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 99.

352. See id. at 95.
353. See id. at 100.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See id
See id at 95.
See id. at 100.
See id
See id.
See id. at 104.
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the natives.3 " Four administrative districts were created by Joint Decision
No. 5 of 1965: Port-Villa, Lenakel, Port-Sandwich, and Luganville.3 6'
Legislative power over the natives derived from Article VIII-3 of the
Protocol.362
The source of the legislative power of the High
Commissioners over nonnatives is Article VII, which stated that "'[t]he
High Commissioners [had] the power to issue jointly, for the maintenance
of order and the good government of the Group, ... local regulations,
binding on all the inhabitants of the Group without exception, and to
enforce [them] by imposing one or more... penalties in respect of each
offence....,363 Daniel O'Connell asks whether the grant of power is to
be construed as plenary, or inherently limited. 364 According to O'Connell,
there are many detailed matters in the Protocol which would
be redundant if the High Commissioners had been endowed
with plenary powers.
*.. Joint Regulations would, on a literal interpretation
of the French text, be valid only when enacted for
administrative purposes, and would be invalid when they went
beyond technicalities ' and sought to deal with the
fundamentals of the social and economic structure.365
The authority given to the High Commissioners to delegate their powers to
the Resident Commissioners "is not the least of the [Protocol's]
curiosities," as it is unclear if the drafters meant the High Commissioners
to retain a power of veto over their Resident Commissioners.36 Joint
Standing Order No. 2 of 1956 classified the various Joint instruments as

360. See id
361. See id. at 104 n.4.
362. See id. at 96.

363. Id at 97 (quoting Protocol, art. VII, as amended in 1959, Cmnd. 668; United Kingdom
Treaty Ser. (1959) No. 18.)
364. See id.
365. Id. at 98.
366. Id. at 101. Until 1964, the British and French governments had attempted by different

means to reconcile the necessity of preserving the competence of the High Commissioners with the
requirement that their powers be delegated. See id. For example, "the French High Commissioner
had not properly delegated to the French Resident [Commissioner] the power to make Joint
Regulations because he had reserved the right antecedently to approve of these." Id at 101 n.2.
The Joint Court held in 1964 that "the common effect of these different approaches was to
invalidate the delegation altogether." Id. at 101; see Hagen v. Public Prosecutor (unreported) and
Leeman v. Public Prosecutor (unreported). Note that in French law a delegate is vested with
plenary powers to the exclusion of the delegator during the period of delegation. See O'Connell,
supra note 2, at 102.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss1/3

68

CONDOMIN14
Bantz: the International
Legal Status of Condominia

follows: Regulations (Raglements) for texts of general and permanent
application, Rules (Arrgtjs) that specify in more detail the provision of a
Regulation, Decisions (Dicisions)that have a limited application, and Joint
Standing Orders (Instructions)that regulate the internal organisation of a
condominium department.367
The most original of the New Hebrides public services was probably
thejudicial system.368 Condominial justice was composed of a Joint Court,
courts of first instance, and native courts. 369 The Joint Court was made up
of a president and a judge, designated by each of the condomini.3 7
Although the president had to be of neutral nationality and was appointed
by the King of Spain, the presidential functions were soon taken over by
the British and Frenchjudges acting together.37' The courts of first instance
were composed of both British and French District Agents and an assessor
who had deliberative status, while the native courts were directed by either
the British or the French District Agents, who presided in alternate months
with two assessors providing consultative status. 3' The Joint Court had
primary and final jurisdiction in certain civil cases concerning land.3"
Appeals from the native courts were heard by the Joint Court if the
monetary value was over £40 in civil cases, as well as appeals from the
courts of first instance.37" Convictions for penal matters from the native
court and certain cases from the courts of first instance were reviewed by
the Joint Court.37 The courts of first instance dealt with offences under the
Protocol and Joint Regulations. 3 6 Native courts dealt with criminal cases
involving natives only. 3"
Furthermore, the two governments undertook to establish national
courts that remained national public services as such, even though their
basis was to be found in condominial law.378 In civil cases, these courts

367. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 102 n.3.
368. See id at 122.

369. See id at 122-23.
370. See id. at 124.
371. See id.
372. See id. at 123.

373.
374.
375.
presided

See id. at 123 n.1.
See id.
See id. Where cases were governed by English and French law, British and Frenchjudges
over the respective Joint Court. See id at 125. Civil cases were governed by the

procedure of the country court in England, or of thejustice de paix in France, and criminal cases,

by those of quarter sessions and the tribunaux correctionnels, respectively. See id. at 126.
376. See id. at 125.
377. See id. at 126.
378. See id. at 127.
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had jurisdiction over actions between nonnatives that were not dealt with
by the Joint Court, and the question of whether either the British or the
French courts were competent was solved by referring to the lex contractus,
or the national law of the defehdant. 39 National courts alone were
competent in criminal matters involving nonnatives." ° The relevant
national court had jurisdiction for crimes or offenses when both persons
justiciable by the national courts and persons justiciable either by the Joint
Court or the native courts were involved.38 ' In case both national courts
were competent, judgment was first delivered by national courts for
persons put under their jurisdiction, then the natives were tried by the Joint
Court.382 One major problem was the law applicable to natives.3" 3 Under
Article VIII-4 of the Protocol, the High Commissioners were to "cause a
collection of native laws and customs."'3M These "[were to] be utilized for
the preparation of a code of native law, both civil and penal," but only
when they were considered not to be contratry to public order and the
dictates of humanity.3"5 However, there is no indication that a "collection
of native laws" had been made to prepare the native criminal code that was
enacted in 1 9 2 7 . 3 ' The latter was revised in 1962, but again it seems to
include only French and English jurisprudence. 3 7 Rules of procedure for
native courts in civil and commercial matters were established by the Joint
Court in 1951, but they offered no assistance when there was no native
civil law.3 8' The condominial legal system contained no provisions on torts
or contracts between natives; natives were prevented from setting up

379. See id
380. See id The British jurisdiction was exercised by the High Commissioner of the Western
Pacific's court until 1961 and then by a High Court of the Western Pacific, the powers of which'
were those of the High Court of Justice in England. See id at 131. It consisted of two judges, one
of them being the British Judge in the Group. See id at 132. Appeals went to the High Court of
Appeal of Fiji. See id. The French jurisdiction was exercised according to decrees of 1909, which
created a special French Tribunal for the New Hebrides, invested with the competence of a"justice
de paix a compitence itendue and that of a tribunal criminel." Id. Appeals went to the Court of

Appeal of Noumea. See id
381. See id. at 127.
382. See id.
383. See id at 136.
384. Id.
385. Id.

386. Id
387. See id.
388. See id. In native courts, the "general principles of law" were to apply as well as "native
customary law." In national courts, when the native was a defendant, the law to be applied was that
of the Power of which the nonnative was a dependant, simply because the "law of the defendant"
principle could not apply.
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companies and registering boats.3 9 Births, marriages and death among
natives were not officially recorded until 1967.' 90
D. Condominia andthe InternationalLegal Order
The absence of international personality prevents the condominium
from having an autonomous access to the international legal order.39 ' As
rightly noted by O'Connell, the subjects of international law also make
international law, but territories, just like individuals, can be the addressees
of international norms.3" Condominial territory is such a "passive
subject," as Verdross would have stated.3 93 A condominium only has
mediate relations with the international legal order, that is, through the
activities of the condomini. 394 This is well-exemplified by treaty
application to condominia, for it is perfectly conceivable for condomini to
enter into an agreement that specifically deals with the condominial
territory.395 If the decision to start negotiations is made by the international
condominial organs, the negotiations themselves are always undertaken by
the condomini qua states and not as organs of the condominial
community. 3' According to the principle of juridical equality of the
condomini, condomini always act collectively when it comes to such
negotiations and conclude the agreements in their own names, since the
condominium has neither treaty-making capacity nor treaty-making
power.3" Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty on the Sudan provided that, as a

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See id.
Id
See CORET, supra note 2, at 308.
See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 84.
See id
See id This concept is also well expressed by Cahier:
Faire I'objet d'une norme juridique est indispensable pour avoir la personnalitd
juridique mais cela ne suffit pas obligatoirement. Que 'on songe en effet au sort
de l'esclave que la loi interdit de tuer, ou Ala condition d'un animal qui fait l'objet
d'un hritage. Bien que faisant l'objet d'une rfgle de droit, sera-t-il considdr6
comme un sujet de droit? [To be the subject of a legal norm is indispensable to
legal personality, but this is not necessarily enough. Indeed, one may think of the
lot of the slave whom, by law, it is forbidden to kill, or of the condition of an
animal which comes into an inheritance. Although they are the addressees of a
rule of law, will they be considered subjects of law?].

CAHIER, supranote 129, at 21.
395. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 88.
396. See CORET, supra note 2, at 308.
397. See id.
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general principle, international conventions would only be applicable to the
Sudan through joint action of Egypt and Great Britain.398 In the Annex to
the Article, there are special provisions concerning the application to the
Sudan of conventions of a technical or humanitarian character.399 The
method chosen was to be that of accession effected by a joint instrument;
if accession was not possible, the method was to be chosen by common
accord.' With regard to the New Hebrides, the condomini sometimes
thought of using the colonial application clause of treaties to which they
were both parties.40' This principle was applied for the first time by the
Bern Convention on the Universal Postal Union.4 2 However, "there ha[d]
been no occasion to make treaties especially for the New Hebrides, which
ha[d] no local problems with neighboring States[,] . ..and specific
application to the New Hebrides of general commitments in the multilateral
conventions would only [have] draw[n] international attention to the
anomalous situation of the New Hebrides. '"' 3 The colonial application
clause was used to extend the application of some treaties to the New
Hebrides,' but their number is scant. In practice, however, many treaty
provisions became applicable to the New Hebrides either by virture ofj oint
regulations or through their adoption into the national law of the
condominii.4 °5 All treaties applicable in New Caledonia, save those
excluded upon interpretation, were applicable in the New Hebrides under
the French legal system.4" 6 This was not the case in the British legal system
where treaties usually are not transformed into domestic law.40 7
Questions of international responsibility have already been alluded to
and do not need much development. The absence of international
personality of the condominial community implies that wrongful acts of
condominial organs will call for the direct collective responsibility of the
condomini as would be the case for a joint organ." In the case of a

398. See EL-ERIAN, supra note 1, at 189.

399. See id
400. See id.
401. See CORET, supra note 2, at 310-11.
402. See id.at 308-09.
403. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 88.
404. E.g., the Postal and Telegraphic Conventions, the Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the
World Meteorological Convention (the formula was "'France and United Kingdom ... for
Condominium of the New Hebrides'"). See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 89 n.2 (citing 209

U.N.T.S. 336 (1953)).
405. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 89.

406. See id. at 90.
407. See id
408. See CORET, supra note 2, at 311-12.
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duplication of services, however, it is possible that the responsibility of one
single condomini would be engaged, depending on the kind of competence
it is exercising and the degree of control over the organ. 4
A last word needs to be said about the relations between condominia
and the international legal order: practice has shown that natives are
entitled to the right of self-determination, and for that purpose, they have
been assimilated into those peoples to whom this right applies. Indeed, it
might be possible to consider natives of condominial territories as peoples
under colonial domination, t0 under foreign occupation, or under racist
regime.41' However, since most U.N. Resolutions outside the colonial
context refer to the right of self-determination of peoples within a state (we
may recall that the condominial territory is a nonstate territory), it seems
that the colonial analogy is the best, though one might still invoke a racist
aspect (one merely has to remember the gross inequality of treatment
between natives and nationals of the condomini in the New Hebrides). On
the other hand, the absence of statehood of the condominial territory is an
advantage when it comes to the self-determination/secession dilemma,
since the condominial territory cannot be considered a territory of the
condomini. Self-determination of natives is thus not prejudicial to their
territorial integrity.
This right of self-determination was in fact acknowledged by the
condomini of the Sudan and the New Hebrides. Article 11(1) of the 1936
Treaty on the Sudan expressly stated that the High Contracting Parties
agreed that the well-being of the Sudanese was the principal purpose of
their administration in the Sudan. This was in fact interpreted as leading
to independence,4t 2 for the agreement of February 12, 1953 between Egypt
and Great Britain recognized the right of the Sudanese people to selfdetermination as a consequence of the termination of the condominium.
During a transitional period, the administration of the Sudan was
progressively "sudanized" and representative organs were set up, such as
a Parliament of the Sudan, which declared independence on January 1,
1956. For the New Hebrides, it was the U.N. Committee on Colonialism
that assured that the condominium would be independent by the end of

409. See id. at312-13.
410. U.N. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

411. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs
of States, G.A. Res. 36/103 of 9 December 1981.
412. See CORET, supra note 2, at 169. One might find an analogy with the philosophy
underlying the administration of non-self-governing territories, which for self-determination
purposes indeed were assimilated as colonial countries by the United Nations Special Committee
of Twenty-Four.
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1980. The situation was complicated, first by the need for agreement
between the British government, which had little interest in remaining in
the New Hebrides, and the French government, which was resolved to
retain New Caledonia and French Polynesia, and second by the lack of
consensus between the New Hebridean political parties. At the end of
1978, a "Provisional Government" was set up and "test elections" were

held in 1979. The New
Hebrides became an independent republic under
4 13

the name "Vanuatu."
Contrary to what has often been held, condominia are not mere
provisory situations that are deemed to degenerate into conflict. Most
cases of condominia lasted over a century and a few are still in existence,
for example, the Gulf of Fonseca and the Island of Faisans. However, it
seems wise to admit that they are abnormal situations. States are usually
reluctant to share their domination over territories and peoples, and the
setting up of an international condominial community is often the result of
a failure to allocate a territory to a single state. As such, a condominium
can be seen as a pacific means of dispute settlement - one of many ways
to conciliate conflicting claims. In fact, it has too often been associated
with situations of armed conflict, especially when it comes to succession
condominia. However, one should not forget that the establishment of a
condominium in that situation precisely avoids a serious conflict among the
vanquishers.
However, the fact that condominia are not mere provisory, dangerous
situations, does not imply that they are an efficient means of territorial
settlement. The concrete analysis of condominia dramatically shows to
what cumbersome, and sometimes ridiculous, mechanisms the sacrosanct
juridical and functional equality of the condomini has led. Moreover, the
establishment of a condominial community has often meant an
unacceptable means of foreign domination over natives.
All this obviously shows that the notion of condominium deserves
better treatment by legal doctrine, which had superbly neglected it for
decades. It seems a little late, however, because condominia, like many
other special territorial features, irresistibly evoke situations of the past.

413. For more information on this subject, see James Jupp & Marian Sawer, The New
Hebrides: From Condominium to Independence, 33 AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK 15-26 (1979).
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A

ANNEX

OB

Fig. 1 Condominium on a whole territory
between A and B in a colonial situation
o : the New Hebrides

Fig. 3 Condominium on a portion of territory
(of A) between B and C as a post-war
settlement ('succession condominium')
o : Schleswig-Holstein Duchies

Fig. 2 Condominium on a disputed
land frontier between A and B
ex: Moresnet

Fig. 4 Condominium on a disputed water
frontier between A, B and C: the
case of a bay
ex: the Gulf of Fonseca

Fig. 5 Condominium on a
disputed water frontier between A and B:
the case of a river (not affecting the status of isles)
ex: the 'Frontier Streams'
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Fig. 6 Condominium on an island
between A and B in a
frontier river not subject to
a condominium
e.: the Island of the
Conference
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Fig. 7 Condominium on
a disputed water
frontier between A,
B and C : the case of
a lake
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